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The Currently Mandated Myopia of Rule 
10b-5:  Pay No Attention to That Manager 
Behind the Mutual Fund Curtain 
Kelly S. Kibbie* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the current state of the Rule 10b-51 right of action 
following a constricting trilogy of Supreme Court cases that have rendered it 
a myopic remnant of the right previously endorsed by the United States Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and hundreds of courts over a 
span of numerous decades.2  The Roberts Court’s pronouncement in Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders3 has generated an immense 
amount of criticism4 and a slew of conflicting lower court decisions.5  By 
effectively abolishing most private Rule 10b-5 claims against secondary ac-
tors,6 including lawyers, accountants, credit rating agencies, underwriters and 
securities analysts, and by mistakenly including mutual fund investment man-
agers in the class of ordinary secondary actors,7 the Court has chosen a short-
  
 *  My thanks to Professor Lynn A. Stout, Distinguished Professor of Corporate 
and Business Law, Cornell Law School; Professor Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz 
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; and Professor Allison Hoffman, UCLA 
Assistant Professor of Law. © 2013, Kelly S. Kibbie. 
          1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 2. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.  
 3. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 4. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.  
 5. See infra Part V. 
 6. The phrase “secondary actors” is used herein to refer to persons or entities 
that provide services to or participate in transactions with corporate issuers.  See, e.g., 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF 
SECONDARY ACTORS 1 n.1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Study].  As discussed in Part III, 
the courts have struggled to determine the standards for the imposition of primary 
liability, versus those for secondary liability, with respect to secondary actors under 
the securities laws.  
 7. As discussed in detail below, with respect to a mutual fund investment ad-
viser, the term “secondary actor” is a misnomer.  See, e.g., Brief for the United States 
of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17, Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339892, at *17 [hereinafter U.S. Janus Amicus Brief] (“Un-
like a typical secondary actor such as ‘a lawyer, accountant, or bank,’ an investment 
adviser’s unique and close relationship with a mutual fund makes it essentially a cor-
porate insider.” (internal citation omitted));  Brief of Law Professors William A. Bird-
thistle [Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law], Tamar Frankel 
[Michaels Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School 
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sighted, ill-reasoned standard that ignores the doctrinal foundations of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),8 as well as the practical 
realities and traditional bases of mutual fund law and practice.9    
Specifically, despite the fact that a typical mutual fund10 has no employ-
ees, no office space, no assets other than those it holds for its investors, no 
officers that are not also officers of its investment manager, and no involve-
ment in its own day-to-day management (having delegated such management 
and investment decisions to its investment manager), the Roberts Court has 
mandated that aggrieved investors pursuing private Rule 10b-5 claims must 
ignore fraudulent managers and other “mutual fund malefactors,”11 even 
  
of Law], Lyman P.Q. Johnson [Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and 
Lee School of Law and LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Tho-
mas (Minneapolis) School of Law], Donald C. Langevoort [Thomas Aquinas Rey-
nolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center] & Manning G. Warren 
III [H. Edward Harter Endowed Chair of Commercial Law, Louis D. Brandeis School 
of Law, University of Louisville] as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 15, 
Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4380234, at *15 [hereinafter Law 
Professors’ Janus Amici Brief] (“By labeling themselves taxonomically too remote to 
be held liable, petitioners circumvent the substantive fraud-on-the-market analysis set 
forth in Stoneridge.”); see also, e.g., infra Part IV.  The terms “investment adviser,” 
“investment manager” and “manager” are used interchangeably herein.  See, e.g., 
infra note 243. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ee (2006). 
 9. As discussed later, the “lacunae of securities expertise” on the Supreme 
Court since Justice Powell’s retirement in 1987 has led to random decisions drawn not 
from the complex interplay of the securities laws, but from more general notions, such 
as narrow statutory interpretation.  See A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts 
Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 106, 144 (2011); infra notes 56-
65 and accompanying text.   Further, as evidenced in Janus, the Roberts Court inex-
plicably disregards the reasoned and well-articulated views of those with the deepest 
understanding of the securities laws.  See, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 
7, at *13-14; Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *1 (noting that the 
Amici were prompted to write due to the potential “significant consequences for all 
American shareholders and their investments” and because of their interest “in ensur-
ing a uniform and coherent interpretation of the [1934 Act] and the regulations prom-
ulgated thereunder”); see also infra notes 64-65, 186-87 and accompanying text.  
Without doubt, said Amici represent some of the finest minds in the area of federal 
securities and investment fund regulation. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. Editorial, So No One’s Responsible?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A26 
[hereinafter New York Times Editorial], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011 
/06/15/opinion/15wed2.html?_r=0 (noting that Justice Thomas’ Janus opinion “has 
made it much harder for private lawsuits to succeed against mutual fund malefactors, 
even when they have admitted to lying and cheating[,]” as liability for misstatements 
attaches only to “the one whose name the statement is presented under. . . . [E]ven if 
the entity presenting the statement is a business trust – basically a dummy corporation 
– with no assets, while its owner has the cash.”). 
2
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where they have deceived their fund boards.12  In sum, Janus does real harm: 
it potentially allows a deceitful manager to “coordinate all major aspects of a 
mutual fund”13 for fraudulent purposes, while it reaps increased fees, hides its 
deceit and avoids private Rule 10b-5 liability.  This “pay no attention to the 
manager behind the mutual fund curtain”14 dictate is untenable and should be 
remedied by legislative action.  
Janus’ absolution of all but those with “ultimate authority” in private 
Rule 10b-5(b) actions is particularly concerning in light of the high volume of 
financial frauds during the last decade involving complicit “gatekeepers,”15 
who prioritized their own economic interests over their ethical obligations: 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Global Crossing only begin the long list of 
complicit gatekeeper scandals.16  Janus is especially perplexing in light of the 
numerous front-page stories of mutual fund adviser misconduct over the last 
decade, including scandals involving market timing, late trading, valuation 
misconduct and soft-dollar practices.17 Concurrent with these high-profile 
frauds, recent years have also witnessed highly-publicized failures of the 
SEC, including its failure to discover Bernie Madoff’s estimated $13.2 billion 
to $65 billion Ponzi scheme, despite “credible and specific allegations . . . 
  
 12. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
 13. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *13; see infra note 172,  
(discussing the amount of mutual fund control that a manager must exert in order to 
perpetrate a market timing fraud). 
 14. With apologies to the Kansas balloonist’s embarrassing moment in the 1939 
film classic that catches him demanding Dorothy et al. to deny his obvious control of 
the levers and microphones appearing to enliven the projection of the “Great and 
Powerful Oz”.  THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).  Post-Janus, in-
vestment advisers potentially have impunity in most private Rule10b-5 suits to de-
mand denial of their obvious control of mutual funds, requiring aggrieved investors 
to, in effect, sue the projection.  
 15. See generally Christopher C. Hines, The Corporate Gatekeeper in Ethical 
Perspective, 78 MO. L. REV. 77 (2013).  Certain secondary actors are referred to as 
“gatekeepers”, as they occupy a vital position between issuers and investors that al-
lows them to prevent wrongdoing in certain circumstances.  See, e.g., GAO Study, 
supra note 6, at 1 n.1.  For an excellent summary of the roles of various secondary 
actors in securities transactions, see id. at 11-16. 
 16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Chal-
lenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 305, 311-12 (2004); 
Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1615 (2010); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders: Only the Supreme Court 
Can “Make” a Tree, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (June 
29, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capital-
group-v-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme-court-can-“make”-a-tree/. 
 17. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *23 (citing Josh Fried-
man, FleetBoston, B of A to Pay $675 Million, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at C1). 
3
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repeatedly brought to the attention of SEC staff. . . .”18  Without doubt, gate-
keepers have also shouldered a significant amount of blame for the recent 
financial crisis.19  The Supreme Court’s constriction of the Rule 10b-5 right, 
despite this troubling confluence of events, will most surely disadvantage 
U.S. investors,20 as further set forth herein, unless remedied by legislative and 
administrative action. 
This Article discusses the potentially harmful consequences of the 
above-referenced trilogy of Supreme Court cases with respect to private in-
vestor suits and agency-driven actions, with a particular focus on the effect on 
aggrieved mutual fund investors.  In light of drastically reduced regulatory 
budgets that compromise today’s securities fraud enforcement efforts, this 
issue is particularly timely, given that over forty percent of American house-
holds own mutual fund shares, generally assuming such investments to be 
relatively safe retirement vehicles.21  
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Act22 and describes Rule 10b-523 as promulgated under Section 10(b).  Part 
III discusses the above-referenced trilogy of Supreme Court cases: Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,24 Stoneridge Invest-
  
 18. OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF 
FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME, CASE NO. 
OIG-509 1 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf; Christine 
Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff,  2009 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 947, 952 (2009) (noting that the loss estimate depends on the calculation 
method utilized); id. at 954 n.44.  
 19. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall 
Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial 
Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2011) (discussing the challenges associated 
with being a gatekeeper for a financial institution). 
 20. One scholar hypothesizes that, “in the relatively safe and healthy environ-
ment of twenty-first century United States, perceived threats to financial welfare are 
more salient to most Americans than perceived threats to our physical welfare.”  Hurt, 
supra note 18, at 950-51.  As a result, the criminal sentences of financial fraudsters 
are often greater than those of violent felons.  Id. at 986.  For example, Bernie Eb-
bers’s twenty-five year sentence was “‘longer than the sentences routinely imposed by 
many states for violent crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes such as 
serial child molestation.’”  Id. at 986 (quoting United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 
129 (2d Cir. 2006)).  Further, Bernie Madoff, a “seventy-one-year-old-man who had 
pled guilty quickly and saved the government the burden of a trial” in connection with 
his hedge fund Ponzi scheme was sentenced to 150 years in prison.  Id. at 949.  The 
court characterized his actions as an “extraordinary evil.”  Id.  
 21. INV. CO. INST., 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 86 (52d ed. 2012); 
see infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text for further discussion of mutual funds. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 24. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,25 and Janus.26  Part IV ex-
plores the unique relationship between an investment adviser and a mutual 
fund, with a focus on important doctrinal foundations of the Investment 
Company Act of 194027 (the “1940 Act”) ignored by the Janus Court.  Part V 
examines the confusion among lower courts in adjudicating post-Janus cases 
and defines certain ambiguities and open questions in current Rule 10b-5 law.  
Part VI proposes legislative and regulatory fixes in line with the doctrinal 
underpinnings of the 1934 Act and the 1940 Act.  
II.  STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD AND THE 
ROBERTS COURT  
This Part provides a brief overview of the securities laws involved in the 
subject trilogy of cases.  Although § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability is the fo-
cus of the Court’s analyses, an understanding of § 20 liability is also impor-
tant to the discussion.  Additionally, a brief summary of the Roberts Court’s 
approach to securities-related matters provides a necessary background to 
Part III’s trilogy analysis.   
A. Overview of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
To address widespread financial abuses after the 1929 stock market 
crash, the seventy-third Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
“1933 Act”),28 governing initial securities distributions, and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),29 governing secondary market dis-
tributions.30  The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act (collectively, the “Acts”) “em-
brace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure 
for the philosophy of caveat emptor.”31  To effectuate this purpose, the Acts 
establish an “extensive scheme of civil liability.”32  The SEC and the De-
  
 25. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 26. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64. 
 28. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa). 
 29. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ee). 
 30. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 752 (1975)). 
 31. Id. at 171 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 
151 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 32. Id.; see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983) 
(“Indeed, an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify per-
ceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections by establishing higher 
standards of conduct in the securities industry.”).  Shortly after the promulgation of 
the Acts, Congress passed the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the “Trust Indenture 
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partment of Justice are authorized to institute proceedings and assert penalties 
against violators of various provisions.33  Further, private litigants may sue 
violators of certain provisions that expressly provide for private rights of ac-
tion.34  Private litigants may also sue violators of certain statutes pursuant to 
judicially-created private rights of action found to be implied by such provi-
sions.35  The Supreme Court has historically stressed the importance of pri-
vate antifraud securities actions in supplementing government criminal and 
civil enforcement proceedings.36  Further, the Supreme Court has admonished 
  
Act”), the 1940 Act, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”), 
providing additional enforcement powers to the SEC. 
 33. See, e.g., Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171; GAO Study, supra note 6, at 26.  
The SEC is authorized to bring civil actions in both administrative and court proceed-
ings seeking injunctive relief, disgorgement orders, civil penalties and orders barring 
individuals from the securities industry, among other types of relief.  GAO Study, 
supra note 6, at 26.  The Department of Justice is authorized to impose criminal sanc-
tions under the securities laws of up to $5 million in penalties for individuals, $25 
million in penalties for corporations, and up to 20 years imprisonment.  Id. at 27.   
 34. See infra note 88.  
 35. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life 
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-35 
(1964)).  For an excellent discussion of private express and implied rights under the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act, see Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Re-
marks Before the FINRA Institute at Wharton Certified Regulatory and Compliance 
Professional (CRCP) Program (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/news/speech/2011/spch110811ebw.htm.  Implied private rights of action under the 
1934 Act have been recognized under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder (prohibiting 
fraudulent conduct and material misstatements and omissions); § 13(d) (listing report-
ing requirements with respect to the acquisition of five percent or more of any class of 
equity securities); § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 thereunder (prohibiting misstatements or 
omissions in proxy materials); § 14(e) (prohibiting misstatements and omissions in 
connection with tender offers); and § 29(b) (prohibiting contracts made in violation of 
the 1934 Act or rules promulgated thereunder).  Robert F. Serio & Aric H. Wu, Basic 
Claims Under the Federal Securities Laws, in SECURITIES LITIGATION § 2.2.2[A] 
(Practicing Law Institute, ed., 2011). 
 36. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *24 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 
U.S. 308, 313 (2007)) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 369 (1995)); see also, e.g., Stoneridge 
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 174 n.10 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Then-Commissioner Elisse B. Walter of the SEC explained: 
. . . I believe strongly that the public, Congress, 
courts, and even the securities bar do not fully 
appreciate the interrelationship between pub-
lic and private enforcement.  The impact of 
changes in the parameters or existence of pri-
vate actions on the enforceability of the federal 
securities laws is simply not well understood.  
And yet, it is critical to investors, our securi-
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“that the statute should be construed not technically and restrictively, but 
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”37 
Section 10(b)38 embodies the “general antifraud provision of the 1934 
Act.”39  In 1942, pursuant to authority granted under § 10(b), the Securities 
  
ties markets, and our economy overall that 
these laws remain fully enforceable. . . . 
 
. . . [T]he trend away from private rights of ac-
tion under the securities laws has placed more 
and more pressure on the Commission and 
other regulators to be the sole guardians of the 
statutes. . . . If private rights are cut back fur-
ther, or further constrained, that puts an in-
creasing burden on already scarce governmen-
tal resources.   
 
Walter, supra note 35 (emphasis added) (noting that there are also limitations on the 
SEC’s authority, including the fact that the SEC can’t seek damages and thus “cannot 
necessarily make the victims whole”). 
 37. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *21.  This flexibility is 
especially important with respect to unsophisticated, individual investors.  See, e.g., 
Jennifer O’Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 10b-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 521, 
525 n.21 (2008) (noting that an overwhelming forty six percent of individual investors 
believed that any losses in their stock market investments were insured by the gov-
ernment or a quasi-governmental agency, and twenty two percent were not sure if 
they were insured or not) (citing APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, NASD 
INVESTOR LITERACY RESEARCH: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2003), available at 
www.nasd.com/web/groups/inv _info/documents/investor_information/nasdw_01 
1459.pdf). 
 38. Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe 
as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (emphasis added).   
 39. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171. 
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and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgated Rule 10b-5,40 which further 
delineates prohibited fraudulent activities.   
The judicially-recognized Rule 10b-5 private right of action, “a judicial 
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn,”41 was estab-
lished long ago and has been consistently recognized by the courts.42  Be-
cause Congress has not provided any guidance regarding a Rule 10b-5 private 
right of action, 43 the courts “have had ‘to infer how the 1934 Congress would 
have addressed the issue[s] had the 10b-5 action been included as an express 
provision in the 1934 Act.’”44  Without doubt, a private litigant may not sue 
under Rule 10b-5 for acts that are not prohibited by § 10(b).45  As the Su-
preme Court explained, “our cases considering the scope of conduct prohib-
ited by § 10(b) in private suits have emphasized adherence to the statutory 
  
 40. Id. at 172.  Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange, 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, 
 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or to omit to state a  material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 41. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 42. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 
2296, 2302 (2011); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 165 (2008); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 
n.9 (1971).  
 43. Although Congress has not specifically codified this judicially-created right 
of action, it has implicitly endorsed it on several occasions. See, e.g., infra note 110 
and accompanying text.  
 44. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs 
Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993)). 
 45. Id.  
8
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language, ‘[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute.’”46 
To prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a private plaintiff must prove the fol-
lowing elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defen-
dant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission 
and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation 
or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”47  Significantly, in an 
enforcement action brought by the SEC, neither reliance nor loss need be 
demonstrated.48 
B. “Controlling Person” Liability under §20 of the 1934 Act 
Congress also expressly provided for secondary liability of “control per-
sons”49 under § 20 of the 1934 Act.50  It is important to note a few instances 
  
 46. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)). 
 47. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 n.3 (citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157). 
 48. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 133 (citing Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 
1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549-51 (3d Cir. 
1998)).  In Morrison v. National Australian Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), the 
Court held that Rule 10b-5 was applicable only to U.S. securities transactions.  See, 
e.g., Ted Farris, Limiting Primary Rule 10b-5 Liability for Offering Document Mis-
statements to the Person with Ultimate Authority over the Statement, DORSEY.COM 
(July 21, 2011), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_corp_janus_72011/.  However, Congress 
responded after Morrison with § 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of titles 12 & 15 of the U.S. Code), which 
confirmed the SEC’s authority to bring § 10(b) enforcement actions in matters involv-
ing non-U.S. transactions.  See, e.g., Walter, supra note 35.  With respect to private 
rights, Congress enacted § 929Y requiring the SEC to conduct a study and solicit 
comment regarding the extension of 1934 Act antifraud remedies to non-U.S. transac-
tions.  See, e.g, id.  
 49. Although “control” is not defined in § 20, Rule 405 under the 1933 Act de-
fines “control” as follows: 
The term control (including the terms control-
ling, controlled by and under common control 
with) means the possession, direct or indirect, 
of the power to direct or cause the direction of 
the management and policies of a person, 
whether through the ownership of voting secu-
rities, by contract, or otherwise. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012) (emphasis added); see GAO Study, supra note 6, at 29-30 
(noting that “the determination of whether control exists depends on the particular 
factual circumstance of each case”). 
 50. Section 20 provides in pertinent part: 
 
(a) . . . Every person who, directly or indi-
rectly, controls any person liable under any 
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provision of this chapter or of any rule or regu-
lation thereunder shall also be liable jointly 
and severally with and to the same extent as 
such controlled person to any person to whom 
such controlled person is liable (including to 
the Commission in any action brought under 
paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this ti-
tle [providing for injunctive relief and civil 
penalties]), unless the controlling person acted 
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly 
induce the act or acts constituting the violation 
or cause of action. 
 
(b) . . . It shall be unlawful for any person, di-
rectly or indirectly, to do any act or thing 
which it would be unlawful for such person to 
do under the provisions of this chapter or any 
rule or regulation thereunder through or by 
means of any other person. 
. . . . 
(e)  Prosecution of persons who aid and abet 
violations [ – ]For purposes of any action 
brought by the Commission under paragraph 
(1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title [provid-
ing for injunctive relief and civil penalties], 
any person that knowingly or recklessly pro-
vides substantial assistance to another person 
in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of 
any rule or regulation issued under this chap-
ter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such 
provision to the same extent as the person to 
whom such assistance is provided. 
15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006) (emphasis added).  It should be noted that other securities laws 
also provide for control person liability.  For example, § 15 of the 1933 Act provides: 
Every person who, by or through stock owner-
ship, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to 
or in connection with an agreement or under-
standing with one or more other persons by or 
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, 
controls any person liable under sections 77k 
or 77l, [§§ 11 or 12] shall also be liable jointly 
and severally with and to the same extent as 
such controlled person to any person to whom 
such controlled person is liable, unless the con-
trolling person had no knowledge of or reason-
able ground to believe in the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability of the 
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in which § 20 would not provide an avenue of redress for an aggrieved inves-
tor.  First, in order to establish liability of a “control person” under § 20(a), 
the liability of the “controlled person” must be established.  As articulately 
discussed by the Janus dissent,51 § 20(a) would be inapplicable in the case of 
an actor exploiting an innocent intermediary.52  Second, it is currently uncer-
tain whether entities acting through innocent intermediaries are liable under § 
20(b).53  Finally, § 20(e), added in 1995,54 only applies with respect to actions 
brought by the SEC.55 
C. A Note on the Court 
Since Justice Powell’s retirement in June 1987,56 there has been no 
member of the Supreme Court with a background in securities law.57  This 
twenty-six year void stands in contrast to the fifty years following the enact-
ment of the Acts, when there was usually at least one Justice with expertise in 
the area.58  This gap in the securities arena has led to random decisions drawn 
not from the complex interplay of the securities laws and the financial mar-
kets, but from more general notions, such as narrow statutory interpretation 
  
Id. § 77o; see also, e.g., 15. U.S.C. § § 80a-47 (§ 48 of the 1940 Act), 80b-3, 80b-8(d) 
(§§ 203 and 208(d) of the Advisers Act). 
 51. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text. 
 52. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53. See infra Part V.E.   
 54. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
§104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78t(e)).  In 2010, Congress 
revised § 20(e) to increase the SEC’s authority to bring actions against those who 
merely act recklessly, in addition to those who act with knowledge.  H.R. Rep. No. 
111-517, § 929O (2010); see also, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 133 n. 193. 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t.  After Janus, the SEC’s efforts to pursue aiders and 
abettors will be hindered if there is no primary violator.  See infra notes 215-19 and 
accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Powell Dies at 90, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national 
/longterm/supcourt/stories/powell082698.htm.  
 57. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 106; see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 
841, 847 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell].  
 58. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 106.  Justice William O. Douglas, former 
chairman of the SEC, and Justice Powell, a practitioner before his time on the Court, 
were the only two securities lawyers to serve on the Court since the enactment of the 
1933 Act and the 1934 Act.  See Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, supra note 57, at 
847.  Justice Douglas served on the Court from 1939 to 1975.  See William O. Doug-
las, OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHI.-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/justices 
/william_o_douglas/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).   Justice Powell served from 1972 to 
1987.  See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHI.-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/lewis_f_powell_jr (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). 
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and legislative history.59  As discussed below in Part IV the Court’s seeming 
lack of understanding of the complexities of the mutual fund/adviser relation-
ship has caused “real damage.”60 
Paradoxically, a disproportionately large 2.6% of the cases heard by the 
Roberts Court during its first six years (2005-2011) were securities-related, in 
contrast to 0.7% heard by the New Deal Court (1936-1954), 0.5% heard by 
the Warren Court (1954-1969), 1.3% heard by the Burger Court (1969-1986), 
and 0.9% heard by the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005).61  The Roberts Court 
has come to be known by many analysts as a “pro-business” Court, with dra-
matic increases from previous Courts in its percentage of rulings for business 
  
 59. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 108, 144 (“When one turns to the substance of 
the opinions written in these cases, one finds little effort to grapple with the relation 
between the financial markets and the securities laws.”); see also id. at 138 (“Janus 
provides additional evidence of the Roberts Court’s lack of engagement with the 
securities laws.  Only Sections 20(b) is [sic] mentioned in the majority’s opinion, and 
then only in a footnote.  Neither the majority, nor the dissent, grapples with the com-
plicated regulatory overlap of the securities laws to determine precisely what is given 
up by liming the Rule 10b-5 cause of action.”). 
 60. Gordon, supra note 16 (detailing the degree of an adviser’s control over a 
mutual fund and noting that the Court could have avoided the “collateral damage” 
created by Janus by basing its decision on loss causation grounds); see also, e.g., 
Stephen Juris, Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders and the Law of 
Unintended Consequences, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2011, 11:51 AM), http: 
//www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2011/09/21/janus-capital-group-inc-v-first-derivative-
traders-and-the-law-of-unintended-consequences/ (discussing the Janus aftermath, 
which has had a deleterious effect on numerous SEC actions in the lower courts, and 
lamenting the fact that “broadly worded decisions in the private securities litigation 
context can result in unintended – and likely unanticipated – problems for regula-
tors”).  As discussed herein, it remains to be seen how much damage the Janus deci-
sion will have on the fight against fraudulent activity in the U.S. capital markets. 
 61. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 107 (“That increase suggests the Justices have 
taken a new interest in the field, despite the lack of a Justice with a background in 
securities law.”).  The Roberts Court has issued numerous decisions regarding the 
PSLRA, enacted in 1995, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (the 
“SLUSA”), enacted in 1998.  See id. at 108.  
12
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interests.62  Its rulings carving away the private Rule 10b-5 right have most 
definitely been pro-business and anti-investor.63 
Another defining characteristic of the Roberts Court has been its cava-
lier attitude towards the SEC’s positions in numerous cases.64  This attitude is 
in stark contrast to the New Deal Court’s absolute respect for and deferral to 
the SEC.  As noted by one Supreme Court scholar, “the expertise of the SEC 
was a bedrock belief among the New Deal alumni that Roosevelt appointed to 
the Supreme Court.65  Such judicial deference resulted in frequent victories 
for the SEC during its first forty years.66 The Court’s brusque dismissal of the 
SEC’s interpretations in the cases discussed below is illustrative of this shift 
in ideology. 
III.  THE TURNABOUT TRILOGY 
A.  Central Bank 
In 1994, the Supreme Court handed down its 5-4 decision in Central 
Bank, which abolished private aiding and abetting liability under §10(b) of 
the 1934 Act.67  The decision was extremely controversial, because it over-
turned “hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every [c]ircuit 
in the federal system.”68  Indeed, “all 11 Courts of Appeals to have consid-
  
 62. Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts.html ?page-
wanted=all (citing a study by scholars at Northwestern University and the University 
of Chicago analyzing 1,450 decisions since 1953, finding that the Roberts Court ruled 
in favor of business litigants in sixty one percent of cases, compared with Courts since 
1953 that have made pro-business rulings in forty two percent of cases).  The study 
also found that the percentage of cases involving business interests has grown during 
the Roberts years.  Id.  However, some legal scholars assert that “[i]f the court favors 
business . . . it is as part of a broader orientation toward free markets and a wariness 
of many kinds of lawsuits.”  Id.; see also, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 142-43. 
 63. See, e.g.,Walter, supra note 35 (“Despite the broad sweep of the [PSLRA], to 
this day the Supreme Court continues to demonstrate what I would characterize as 
hostility toward private rights.”).   
 64. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 117; see also infra notes 187-88 and accom-
panying text. 
 65. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 117 (footnotes omitted). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 511 U.S. 164, 191-92 (1994).  The majority opinion was written by Justice 
Kennedy, with Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas joining.  Id. at 166.  
Justice Stevens wrote for the dissent, with Justices Blackmun, Souter and Ginsberg 
joining.  Id. 
 68. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Notably, because the private aiding and 
abetting cause of action was so well-settled,  
“[P]etitioner assumed the existence of a right 
of action against aiders and abettors, and 
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ered the question have recognized a private cause of action against aiders and 
abettors under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”69 
1.  Central Bank Background 
Central Bank served as indenture trustee for bond issuances in 1986 and 
1988 by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (the 
“Authority”).70  The bond covenants required the bonds to be secured by 
landowner assessment liens on property with a value of at least 160% of the 
outstanding principal and interest of the bonds.71  Pursuant to the bond cove-
nants, AmWest Development (“AmWest”) was required to give Central Bank 
an annual report evidencing that the 160% test was satisfied.72 
In early 1988, AmWest delivered to Central Bank an appraisal of the 
land securing the 1986 bonds and of the land that was proposed to secure the 
1988 bonds.73  However, the 1988 appraisal showed virtually no change in 
the values set forth in the 1986 appraisal.74  The senior underwriter of the 
1986 bonds thereafter sent a letter to Central Bank expressing concern that 
the 1988 appraisal was inaccurate, as local property values had declined, and 
that the 160% was not being satisfied.75  Following an exchange of corre-
spondence between Central Bank and AmWest, Central Bank agreed to post-
pone conducting an independent review of the appraisal until late 1988, six 
months after the closing on the June 1988 bond issue.76  The Authority de-
faulted on the 1988 bonds before the independent review was completed.77 
Respondents, purchasers of $2.1 million of the 1988 bonds, sued several 
defendants alleging primary violations of §10(b) and also sued Central Bank, 
  
sought review only of the subsidiary questions 
whether an indenture trustee could be found li-
able as an aider and abettor absent a breach of 
an indenture agreement or other duty under 
state law, and whether it could be liable as an 
aider and abettor based only on a showing of 
recklessness.”   
Id. at 194.  However, “the Court sua sponte directed the parties to address a question 
on which even the petitioner justifiably thought the law was settled, and reache[d] out 
to overturn a most considerable body of precedent.”  Id. at 194-95. 
 69. Id. at 192. 
 70. Id. at 167 (majority opinion). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 168. 
 77. Id. 
14
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alleging secondary liability under §10(b) for aiding and abetting the fraud.78  
The lower court granted Central Bank’s motion for summary judgment, and 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.79 
2.  The Decision 
The issue before the Supreme Court in Central Bank was whether aiding 
and abetting liability could be imposed under §10(b).80   Recognizing that the 
definition of conduct prohibited by §10(b) must be controlled by the statutory 
text, the majority prefaced its highly controversial opinion: “That bodes ill for 
respondents, for ‘the language of Section 10(b) does not in terms mention 
aiding and abetting.’”81   
Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it 
chose to do so. If…Congress intended to impose aiding and abet-
ting liability, we presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and 
‘abet’ in the statutory text.  But it did not.82 
The Court rejected the argument by respondents and the SEC that the 
phrase “directly or indirectly” in §10(b) covers aiding and abetting liability, 
explaining that “aiding and abetting liability extends beyond persons who 
engage, even indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and abetting liability 
reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who 
give a degree of aid to those who do.”83  Because §10(b) prohibits only con-
duct that is manipulative or deceptive, the majority opined that there can be 
no liability for acts merely involving the provision of aid to persons commit-
ting manipulative or deceptive acts.84   “We cannot amend the statute to cre-
ate liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within 
the meaning of the statute.”85 
  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 166-67.  
 81. Id. at 175 (citing Brief for the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 8, Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (No. 92-854), 1993 WL 
13006275).   
 82. Id. at 176-77 (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 176.  The majority cited numerous provisions in the 1934 Act using the 
phrase “directly or indirectly” that do not impose aiding and abetting liability.  Id. 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(2)(C) (direct or indirect stock ownership), § 78i(b)(2)-(3) 
(direct or indirect option, put, call, straddle or privilege interest), § 78m(d)(1) (direct 
or indirect beneficial ownership), § 78p(a) (direct or indirect beneficial ownership), § 
78t (direct or indirect control of violator of the 1934 Act)). 
 84. Id. at 177.  Importantly, respondents conceded that Central Bank had not 
committed a manipulative or deceptive act.  Id. at 191. 
 85. Id. at 177-78. 
15
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Holding that the language of the statute resolved the case, the majority 
stated that it would have reached the same conclusion even if the language 
had not been determinative by analyzing how the 1934 Congress would have 
resolved the issue. 86  If Congress had enacted an express private right of ac-
tion in § 10(b), the majority reasoned, that right would be similar to other 
express private rights of action in the Acts;  thus, interpretive guidance with 
respect to §10(b) is obtainable by analyzing other express rights enumerated 
in the Acts.87 
Because private aiding and abetting liability was not included in any of 
the express causes of actions under the Acts, 88 the majority concluded that 
  
 86. Id. at 178. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 179 (citing Ch. 38, §§ 11, 12, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); Ch. 404, §§ 9, 16, 18, 
20A, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)).  Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act allows a private suit for 
registration statements containing untrue statements or omissions of a material fact 
against the following enumerated persons: 
1. every person who signed the registration 
statement; 
2. every person who was a director of (or per-
son performing similar functions) or partner in 
the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of 
the registration statement with respect to which 
his liability is asserted; 
3. every person who, with his consent, is 
named in the registration statement as being or 
about to become a director, person performing 
similar functions, or partner; 
4. every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or 
any person whose profession gives authority to 
a statement made by him, who has with his 
consent been named as having prepared or cer-
tified any part of the registration statement, or 
as having prepared or certified any report or 
valuation which is used in connection with the 
registration statement, with respect to the 
statement in such registration statement, re-
port, or valuation, which purports to have been 
prepared or certified by him; 
5. every underwriter with respect to such se-
curity. 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (2006)).  Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act provides a private 
right of action against any person who “offers or sells a security in violation of section 
5” of the 1933 Act (which sets forth “gun-jumping” violations and prospectus re-
quirements) or who “offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication” that includes an untrue statement or omission of material fact.  Id. § 
77l(a)).  It should be noted that investors in offerings that are exempt from registration 
under Regulation S (certain non-U.S. offerings) or under § 4 of the 1933 Act (for 
example, § 4(2) private placements or Rule 144A qualified institutional buyer offer-
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“Congress likely would not have attached aiding and abetting liability to 
§10(b) had it provided [an express] private §10(b) cause of action.”89  The 
majority rested its analysis on its belief that permitting such a cause of action 
would allow petitioners to circumvent the required element of reliance.90 
Respondents and some amici argued that, because liability for aiding 
and abetting was “well established in both civil and criminal actions by 
1934,” Congress intended that such liability be incorporated into the 1934 
Act.”91 The majority rejected this argument in light of Congress’ “statute-by-
statute approach to civil aiding and abetting liability” and its enactment of 
§20 imposing secondary liability with respect to control persons.92  [W]hen 
Congress wished to create such [secondary] liability, it had little trouble do-
ing so.”93  Similarly, the majority rejected arguments that Congress’ failure to 
revise §10(b) after courts began imposing aiding and abetting liability there-
under illustrated congressional intent to impose such liability.94  It concluded 
that mere inaction by Congress could not amend a formally enacted statute, 95 
  
ings) may not sue under § 11 or § 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.  See, e.g., Farris, supra 
note 48.  
  Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides for a private right of action against 
persons engaging in manipulative acts, such as wash sales and matched orders.  15 
U.S.C. § 78i(e); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179.  Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act allows 
a private action by the issuer of a security against directors, officers, or beneficial 
owners of more than ten percent of any class of any registered equity security who 
engage in short-swing trading. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).  Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act 
allows a private right of action against “[a]ny person who shall make or cause to be 
made any statement” that “was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under 
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact” in any docu-
ment filed with the SEC. Id. § 78r(a).  Finally, § 20A, which was enacted in 1988, 
provides for a private right of action against persons engaging in insider trading ac-
tivities.  15 U.S.C. § 78t-1; Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179.   
  Additionally, § 15 under the 1933 Act and § 20 of the 1934 Act provide for 
control person liability.  See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.  Control per-
son liability under § 15 of the 1933 Act is limited to cases involving a primary viola-
tion of §§ 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act.  See, e.g, GAO Study, supra note 6, at 29. 
 89. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 179-80. 
 90. Id. at 180. 
 91. Id. at 180-81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brief for the Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 81, at 10). 
 92. Id. at 181-85. 
 93. Id. at 184 (alteration in original) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 662, 650 
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94. Id. at 185-88. 
 95. Id. at 186 (citing Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (“[W]e 
walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a con-
trolling legal principle”). 
17
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reasoning that  “several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such 
inaction.”96 
In a well-written dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized that “judges closer 
to the times and climate of the 73d Congress than we concluded that holding 
aiders and abettors liable was consonant with the Exchange Act’s purpose to 
strengthen the antifraud remedies of the common law.”97  Explaining the 
Court’s change across time in its approach to implied causes of action, Justice 
Stevens explained:  
Our approach to implied causes of action, as to other matters of 
statutory construction, has changed markedly since the . . . Ex-
change Act’s passage in 1934.  At that time, and indeed until quite 
recently, courts regularly assumed, in accord with the traditional 
common-law presumption, that a statute enacted for the benefit of 
a particular class conferred on members of that class the right to 
sue violators of that statute.98 
Noting that none of the cases relied upon by the majority with respect to 
its strict interpretation of §10(b) “even arguably involved a settled course of 
lower court decisions,” Justice Stevens asserted that a “settled construction of 
an important federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress 
so decides.”99  “[W]e should also be reluctant to lop off rights of action that 
have been recognized for decades, even if the judicial methodology that gave 
them birth is now out of favor.”100 
Countering the majority’s refusal to confer meaning with respect to 
Congress’ inaction,101 the dissent noted that, in its comprehensive amend-
ments to the 1934 Act in 1975, “Congress left untouched the sizeable body of 
case law approving aiding and abetting liability in private actions under 
  
 96. Id. at 187.  The majority also rejected policy arguments asserted by the SEC, 
stating that policy considerations cannot take precedence over the interpretation of the 
statutory text and structure, “except to the extent that they may help to show that 
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result ‘so bizarre’ that Congress 
could not have intended it.”  Id. at 188 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 
184, 191 (1991)). 
 97. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 195.  The dissent further explained, “In light of the encompassing lan-
guage of § 10(b), and its acknowledged purpose to strengthen the antifraud remedies 
of the common law, it was certainly no wild extrapolation for courts to conclude that 
aiders and abettors should be subject to the private action under § 10(b).”  Id. at 198-
99, 199 n.9 (noting that the Court had recognized a private right of action against 
secondary actors absent a provision specifically including them in Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394 (1982)). 
 99. Id. at 196, 196 n.6 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100. Id. at 201.  
 101. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
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§10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”102  Such amendments “emerged from the most 
searching reexamination of the competitive, statutory, and economic issues 
facing the securities markets, the securities industry, and, of course, public 
investors, since the 1930’s.”103  Further, the SEC “has consistently under-
stood §10(b) to impose aider and abettor liability since shortly after the rule’s 
promulgation.”104 
The Court’s conclusion is particularly relevant with respect to the Janus 
analysis: 
The absence of §10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean 
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free 
from liability under the securities Acts.  Any person or entity, in-
cluding a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulat-
ive device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on 
which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a 
primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for 
primary liability under rule 10b-5 are met.  In any complex securi-
ties fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators; in 
this case, for example, respondents named four defendants as pri-
mary violators.105 
3.  Legislative Response to Central Bank 
As recognized by the Central Bank dissent, the opinion left little doubt 
that even the SEC could not pursue aiders and abettors under §10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.106  The opinion instigated petitions for Congress to enact a statutory 
cause of action for aiding and abetting liability, and the Senate held hearings 
on the issue within a month of Central Bank’s release.107  The Chairman of 
the SEC at the time, Arthur Levitt, testified before the Senate Securities Sub-
committee and recommended enacting a private right of action for aiding and 
abetting liability.108  Members of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities also 
supported a private right of action.109  Congress declined to do so,110 but in-
  
 102. Id. at 197. 
 103. Id. at 197 n.8 (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
385 n.20 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. at 198 (citing Reves, 494 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 105. Id. at 191 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 199 n.10 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 107. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158, 173 
(citing S. Rep. No. 104-98 at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679). 
 108. Id. at 158 (citing S. Hearing No. 103-759, at 13-14 (1994)). 
 109. Id. at 173-74, 174 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing views of Senators 
Dodd, Sarbanes, Boxer and Bryan). 
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stead enacted §20(e) of the 1934 Act, as part of the PSLRA,111 enabling the 
SEC to pursue injunctive relief and civil penalties against aiders and abet-
tors.112  Section 20(e) was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 to relax 
the previous “knowledge” state of mind requirement to recklessness.113  
After the Enron scandal became public in late 2001, legislation was once 
again proposed, but not enacted, to restore private aiding and abetting liabil-
ity.114  Further, neither the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-
Oxley”)115 nor the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 did anything to restore pre-
Central Bank private aiding and abetting liability.116  The Dodd-Frank Act 
  
 110. It is interesting to note that the 1995 (pre-2008 financial meltdown, pre-
Enron, pre-WorldCom . . .) Congress chose not to enact private Rule 10b-5 aiding and 
abetting liability, while all Circuits before Central Bank assumed that the 1934 (post-
1929 Crash, mid-Great Depression) Congress intended such liability.  See supra note 
68. 
 111. The PSLRA was enacted to weed out frivolous securities lawsuits by requir-
ing, among other things, heightened pleading requirements and an automatic discov-
ery stay.  Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified with amendments 
throughout 15 U.S.C.); see, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 9, at 109.  For an excellent 
summary of the PSLRA, see the GAO Study, supra note 6, at 18-22.  The Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) preempts certain state law securi-
ties fraud class actions and was designed to prohibit plaintiffs from circumventing the 
requirements of the PSLRA.  Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified 
with amendments throughout 15 U.S.C.); see, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 22-23 
(providing a summary of the SLUSA); Pritchard, supra note 9, at 109-10.  Congress 
also enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) in 2005, which provides federal 
court jurisdiction and minimum diversity requirements with respect to class actions 
with 100 or more petitioners.  Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified 
throughout 28 U.S.C); see also, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 23. 
 112. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006); see supra note 50 and accompanying text; see 
also, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158. 
 113. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 929O, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see, e.g., DAN L. GOLDWASSER, M. 
THOMAS ARNOLD & JOHN J. EICKEMEYER, ACCOUNTANT’S LIABILITY § 5.8.2, at 5-125 
to -126 (2011). 
 114. See, e.g., GOLDWASSER, ARNOLD & EICKEMEYER, supra note 113, at 5-125 to 
-126 (discussing the Accountability for Accountants Act of 2002, H.R. 3617, 107th 
Cong. § 3 (2002); Comprehensive Investor Protection Act, H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. § 
14 (2002); the Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2002, H.R. 3829, 
107th Cong. § 3 (2002); Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. 1933, 107th Cong. § 3).  
Bills were also introduced in 2009 by Senator Arlen Specter and in 2010 by Repre-
sentative Maxine Waters that provided for secondary liability in securities fraud ac-
tions.  See Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 
REP. NO. 1551 (2009); Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 
2010, H.R. 5042, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Susan E. Hurd & Elizabeth P. Skola, 
Stoneridge: Closing the Door on Expansive Section 10(b) Liability Theories, in 27 
SECURITIES LITIGATION: FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1.3 (2012). 
 115. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 116. See, e.g., GOLDWASSER, ARNOLD & EICKEMEYER, supra, note 113, at 5-126. 
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did require the Comptroller of the United States to issue the GAO Study, 
which has had little, if no, effect on legislators to date.117  
B. Stoneridge 
After Central Bank’s ban on aiding and abetting liability, conflicting 
approaches to “scheme liability” evolved in the courts as plaintiffs asserted 
that secondary actors participating in fraudulent schemes were primarily li-
able under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).118  Fourteen years after Central Bank, the 
Roberts Court delivered its 5-3 decision in Stoneridge, which further re-
stricted the Rule 10b-5 private right of action.119   
1.  Stoneridge Background 
Petitioner, representing a class of purchasers of stock (“Investors”) is-
sued by Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”), a cable operator, filed suit 
alleging that Charter violated §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by inflating its reported 
revenues by approximately $17 million in order to hide an expected cash flow 
deficiency of $15 to $20 million.120   According to Investors, Charter enlisted 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola (the “Suppliers”), its suppliers of digital ca-
ble converter boxes (also known as “set-top boxes”), to alter the terms of their 
contractual arrangements with Charter so that Charter’s financials would 
meet expectations.121  Specifically, Charter and Suppliers agreed that Charter 
would overpay Suppliers by $20 for each set-top box until year-end and that 
Suppliers would return such overpayment though their purchase of advertis-
  
 117. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Z; GAO Study, supra note 6; see, e.g., GOLDWASSER, 
ARNOLD & EICKEMEYER, supra note 113, at 5-126. 
 118. See, e.g., Kevin J. Lesinski, Notable Cases and Recent Settlements in Securi-
ties Litigation, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON WORKING WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES, COMPLYING WITH NEW 
LEGISLATION, AND MONITORING COMPLIANCE 91, 98 (2011 ed.) (explaining that the 
Ninth Circuit’s view was that deceptive conduct part of a “scheme to defraud” was 
actionable under 10(b), while the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ view was that conduct 
without a misstatement or omission was not actionable). 
 119. As in Central Bank, Justice Kennedy penned the majority opinion, with Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas joining, and Justice Stevens wrote for the dissent, with Jus-
tices Souter and Ginsberg joining.  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 150 (2008).  Justices Roberts and Alito also joined the major-
ity.  Id.  Justice Breyer did not participate.  Id.  Interestingly, while the SEC sided 
with Investors (Petitioners/Plaintiffs), the Solicitor General sided with Supplier (Re-
spondents/Defendants).  See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 132. 
 120. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Because the case 
reached the Court upon the lower court’s granting of Suppliers’ motion to dismiss, the 
facts alleged by Investors are assumed to be true.  See id. at 153 (majority opinion). 
 121. Id. at 153-54 (majority opinion). 
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ing from Charter.122  Because Charter would capitalize the purchase of the 
set-top boxes and record the advertising sales as revenue in violation of gen-
erally accepted accounting principles, Charter could deceive its auditor into 
approving false financial statements demonstrating that it had met its pro-
jected cash flow and revenue numbers.123   
Suppliers, who played no part in the preparation or distribution of Char-
ter’s financial statements, recorded the above-described transactions as a 
“wash, under generally accepted accounting principles.”124  Investors alleged 
that Suppliers “knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter’s intention to 
use the transactions to inflate its revenues and knew the resulting financial 
statements issued by Charter would be relied upon by research analysts and 
investors.”125  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling granting Suppliers’ motion to dismiss its decision.126 
2. The Decision 
The majority prefaced its opinion by noting that the circuit courts were 
in disagreement regarding whether a plaintiff could recover under §10(b) 
against a party that did not make a public misrepresentation or violate a duty 
to disclose but did participate in a prohibited scheme under §10(b).127 The 
Court determined that Suppliers’ “course of conduct included both oral and 
written statements, such as the backdated contracts agreed to by Charter and 
respondents” and conceded that “[c]onduct itself can be deceptive.” 128  How-
ever, the Court found that the lack of reliance was fatal to Investors’ claim, 
  
 122. Id. at 154.  Suppliers drafted false documents in furtherance of the fraudulent 
scheme. Id.  Specifically, Scientific-Atlanta sent documents to Charter that falsely 
stated that, in light of increased production costs, the price of the set-top boxes would 
be increased by twenty dollars per box. Id.  Motorola, by written contract, obligated 
Charter to purchase a defined number of set-top boxes, with liquidated damages of 
twenty dollars due for each box that it did not take, knowing that Charter would pay 
the liquidated damages.  Id.  Further, Suppliers signed contracts with Charter agreeing 
to purchase advertising at an inflated rate and backdated the set-top box contracts so 
that the agreements would not appear to be connected.  Id. at 154-55.  These arrange-
ments allowed Charter to inflate its reported revenue and operating cash flow num-
bers by approximately $17 million.  Id. at 155.  Such inflated numbers were included 
in financial statements filed with the SEC and were publicly reported.  Id. 
 123. Id. at 154. 
 124. Id. at 155. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.; see In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 
2006), aff’d sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 
148 (2008). 
 127. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted). 
 128. Id. at 158. 
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noting that reliance provided the “requisite causal connection between a de-
fendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.”129   
Investors argued that, under the theory of “scheme liability,” Suppliers 
were liable even without having made a public statement.130  Rejecting this 
notion, the majority opined: 
In effect [P]etitioner contends that in an efficient market investors 
rely not only upon the public statements relating to a security but 
also upon the transactions those statements reflect.  Were this con-
cept of reliance to be adopted, the implied cause of action would 
reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does 
business; and there is no authority for this rule….131 
The Court concluded that Suppliers’ deceptive acts were “too remote to 
satisfy the element of reliance,” noting that such acts were not publicly dis-
closed.132 “It was Charter, not [Suppliers], that misled its auditor and filed 
fraudulent financial statements; nothing [Suppliers] did made it necessary or 
inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.”133  Because Inves-
tors could not demonstrate reliance on Suppliers’ alleged acts, except through 
  
 129. Id. at 159 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).   The majority explained that there was a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance in two instances:  (1) where there is an omission of a material 
fact by a person who has a duty to disclose, and (2) where there are public statements 
and the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is applicable.  Id.  The majority found neither of 
these instances were applicable in the case at bar.  Id.  The dissent noted that, because 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision was not based on a lack of reliance, the majority should 
have remanded for a determination of whether reliance had been properly alleged.  Id. 
at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 159-60 (majority opinion). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  The majority stated that it was irrelevant whether the Investors had pled 
reliance under the standards of common law, as § 10(b) “does not incorporate com-
mon-law fraud into federal law.”  Id. at 162.  However, Pritchard notes: 
It would seem more accurate to say that the in-
corporation is selective: the Court borrows the 
common law element of reliance, without 
really explaining why, but then disregards it 
when inconvenient.  Kennedy’s rejection of 
common law standards in Stoneridge suggests 
that the Court is charting its own common law 
course.  The Court’s interventions, however, 
are episodic; the Court takes an insufficient 
number of securities cases to develop this 
“common law” in any meaningful manner. 
Pritchard, supra note 9, at 134-35. 
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a remote and indirect chain of events, the majority held that the motion to 
dismiss was properly granted.134   
The dissent disagreed, asserting that the majority erroneously insisted on 
“a kind of super-causation”135 to prove reliance.  Specifically, the dissent 
reasoned that the fraud-on-the-market presumption (which protects investors 
who cannot demonstrate individual reliance) does not speak to how a corpo-
ration or individual causes the misleading information to reach the market.136 
As such, the dissent concludes that the majority “has it backwards when it 
first addresses the fraud-on-the-market presumption, rather than the causation 
required.”137   Succinctly stated, “[t]he argument is not that the fraud-on-the-
market presumption is enough standing alone, but that a correct view of cau-
sation coupled with the presumption would allow [P]etitioner to plead reli-
ance.”138  Therefore, in the dissent’s view, it was foreseeable that Suppliers’ 
actions caused Investors to undertake the securities transactions at issue.139  
The Court also declined to extend the private right of action under 
§10(b) to “the realm of ordinary business operations[,]” which, it noted, is 
primarily governed by state law:140  “Just as §10(b) is surely badly strained 
when construed to provide a cause of action . . . to the world at large, it 
should not be interpreted to provide a private cause of action against the en-
tire marketplace in which the issuing company operates.”141  The dissent con-
vincingly countered that “liability only attaches when the company doing 
business with the issuing company has itself violated § 10(b).”142 
  
 134. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.  Pritchard notes that the majority could have 
more naturally reached its conclusion by relying on the “in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security” language in § 10(b), rather than the reliance analysis.  
Pritchard, supra note 9, at 132-33, 138.  One reason for not doing so is that this ap-
proach could have restricted the SEC, which does not need to prove reliance in the 
matters it pursues.  Id. 
 135. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 168 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 171 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 172. 
 140. Id. at 161 (majority opinion).  Because Suppliers’ activities “took place in the 
marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere,” and because 
“Charter was free to do as it chose in preparing its books . . . and then issuing its fi-
nancial statements[,]” Investors could not have relied on Suppliers’ alleged deceptive 
actions in deciding whether to purchase or sell securities.  Id. at 166-67.   
 141. Id. at 162 (citations omitted) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.5 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[T]he § 
10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries. . . . It is 
appropriate for us to assume that when . . . [the PSLRA] was enacted, Congress ac-
cepted the § 10(b) private cause of action as then defined but chose to extend it no 
further.”  Id. at 165-66 (citing Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 
1102 (1991)). 
 142. Id. at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Particularly relevant to Janus, the majority noted, as it did in Central 
Bank, that in addition to the threat of criminal penalties and state actions, 
secondary actors may face private suit: 
All secondary actors, furthermore, are not necessarily immune 
from private suit.  The securities statutes provide an express private 
right of action against accountants and underwriters in certain cir-
cumstances and the implied right of action in § 10(b) continues to 
cover secondary actors who commit primary violations.”143 
The Court concluded that its opinion was “consistent with the narrow 
dimensions we must give to a right of action Congress did not authorize when 
it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.”144 
In a strongly-written dissent, Justice Stevens prefaced his opinion by 
stating that the majority “seems to assume” that Suppliers could face aiding 
and abetting liability under § 20(e), but that they escape private liability be-
cause “they are, at most, guilty of aiding and abetting a violation of § 10(b), 
rather than an actual violation of the statute.”145  Justice Stevens labeled the 
majority’s decision a “significant departure” from Central Bank.146 
  
 143. Id. at 166 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (§ 11 of the 1934 Act, see Ch. 404, § 11, 48 Stat. 881 
(1934)); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 191 (1994)).  The majority also noted that the SEC’s “enforcement power is 
not toothless”, noting that since late 2002, the SEC, through enforcement actions, had 
collected more than $10 billion in penalties and disgorgement, with much of that 
money inuring to the benefit of aggrieved investors.  Id. at 166. 
 144. Id. at 167. 
 145. Id. at 167-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 168. 
What the Court fails to recognize is that this 
case is critically different from Central Bank 
because the bank in that case did not engage in 
any deceptive act and, therefore, did not itself 
violate § 10(b). . . . 
 
. . . The facts of this case would parallel those 
of Central Bank if [Suppliers] had, for exam-
ple, merely delayed sending invoices for set-
top boxes to Charter.  Conversely, the facts in 
Central Bank would mirror those in the case 
before us today if the bank had knowingly pur-
chased real estate in wash transactions at 
above-market prices in order to facilitate the 
appraiser’s overvaluation of the security.  Cen-
tral Bank, thus, poses no obstacle to 
[P]etitioner’s argument that it has alleged a 
cause of action under § 10(b). 
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The dissent concluded with a detailed commentary on the importance 
and long history of implied private actions under the 1934 Act.147  Noting that 
“[t]he Court’s current view of implied causes of action is that they are merely 
a ‘relic’ of our prior ‘heady days,’” Justice Stevens stated: “[t]hose ‘heady 
days’ persisted for two hundred years.”148  Tracing the judicial development 
of the common law during the first two centuries of U.S. history, Justice Ste-
vens explained that “[a] basic principle animating our jurisprudence was en-
shrined in state constitution provisions guaranteeing, in substance, that ‘every 
wrong shall have a remedy.’”149  He emphasized how federal courts widely 
enforced private causes of action under the Acts until the Court’s decision in 
Central Bank.150 
During the late 1940’s, the 1950’s, the 1960’s and the early 1970’s 
there was widespread, indeed almost general, recognition of im-
plied causes of action for damages under many provisions of the … 
[1934 Act], including not only the antifraud provisions, §§10 and 
15(c)(1),… but many others.  These included the provision, 
§6(a)(1), requiring securities exchanges to enforce compliance 
with the Act and any rule or regulation made thereunder,…and 
provisions governing the solicitation of proxies….  Writing in 
1961, Professor Loss remarked with respect to violations of the 
antifraud provisions that with one exception ‘not a single judge has 
expressed himself to the contrary.’ ….When damage actions for 
violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 reached the Supreme Court, the 
existence of an implied cause of action was not deemed worthy of 
extended discussion.151 
  
Id. at 169-70.  Justice Stevens stated that he respectfully dissented “from the Court’s 
continuing campaign to render the private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless.”  
Id. at 175. 
 147. Id. at 175-79. 
 148. Id. at 175-76. 
 149. Id. at 176, 176 n.12 (noting that such a guarantee still appears in almost 75 
percent of state constitutions).  Federal courts adopted this principle with regard to 
statutes with open questions of remedy until 1975, when the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), requiring the application of a 
four-factor test to determine whether Congress envisioned a private right of action.  
See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 177-79 (listing implied causes of action recognized by the 
Court under various statutes).  Thereafter, the Supreme Court clarified that an evalua-
tion of Congressional intention as of a certain time “must take into account its con-
temporary legal context.”  Id. at 178 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 
698-99 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150. Id. at 178-79. 
 151. Id. at 179 (quoting Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(Friendly, J.)). 
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Concluding his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens wrote that “Congress 
enacted §10(b) with the understanding that federal courts respected the prin-
ciple that every wrong would have a remedy,” and that the majority’s deci-
sion cuts back further the remedy that Congress intended.152   
C. Janus 
After Central Bank, the circuit courts were split regarding the method of 
distinguishing actionable primary liability for secondary actors from conduct 
for which no right of action existed.153   The “bright-line attribution rule” 
required public attribution of a misstatement or omission to a defendant at the 
time of the dissemination to establish primary liability;  this rule was fol-
lowed by the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.154  The “substantial 
participation rule” required that a defendant’s involvement in a misstate-
  
 152. Id. at 180. 
 153. See, e.g., Liam O’Brien & Alexander Broche, The Impact of the Janus Ruling 
on Secondary Liability in 10b-5 Claims, 15 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. 
ELECTRONIC AGE 10 (2011), available at 15 No. 8 Wallstreetlawyer.com: Sec. Elec. 
Age 10. 
 154. See, e.g., id. (citing In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 
992 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston 
(USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 386-90 (5th Cir. 2007); Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, 256 F.3d 
1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 
1998)).  Arguing against the bright-line attribution rule, the Law Professors’ Janus 
Amici Brief posited that “such a rule would automatically eliminate the possibility of 
review for a vast universe of fraud. . . .”  Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra 
note 7, at *7. 
Consider the numerous cases in which a corpo-
rate executive intentionally misleads a journal-
ist or financial analyst, who in turn publishes 
highly favorable reports without identifying 
the executive as a source.  Even in the absence 
of direct attribution, the executive has never-
theless perpetrated a clear fraud on the market.  
Courts have reasonably responded to such 
cases by finding the executive liable, yet peti-
tioners’ rule would overturn such decisions.  
The sensible approach, set forth by this Court 
in Stoneridge, is instead to inquire whether the 
executive engaged in a deceptive scheme and, 
if so, whether that deception was sufficiently 
proximate to the statements upon which inves-
tors relied.  A strict attribution rule would 
senselessly abort the sound analysis of Ston-
eridge. 
Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
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ment’s creation be sufficient enough to render attribution to such defendant 
reasonable; this rule was adopted by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.155  Fur-
ther, the Tenth Circuit’s rule imposed liability on actors who knew or should 
have known that their statements would reach potential investors who would 
rely on them.156  The SEC’s view, since 1998, has been that primary liability 
under Rule 10b-5 should be imposed where “a person, acting alone or with 
others, creates a misrepresentation – assuming, of course, that he or she acts 
with the requisite scienter.”157  According to the SEC, one “creates” a state-
ment when “the statement is written or spoken by him, or if he provides the 
false or misleading information that another person then puts into the state-
ment, or if he allows the statement to be attributed to him.”158  Three years 
  
 155. See, e.g., O’Brien & Broche, supra note 153 (citing In re Software Tool-
works, Inc. Secs. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 
F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Deriva-
tive Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)).  The Fourth Circuit Janus court reasoned: 
We conclude . . . that given the publicly dis-
closed responsibilities of [Adviser] interested 
investors would infer that [Adviser] played a 
role in preparing or approving the content of 
the Janus fund prospectuses, particularly the 
content pertaining to the funds’ policies affect-
ing the purchase or sale of shares.  It was pub-
licly known that [Adviser] furnished advice 
and recommendations concerning the Janus 
funds’ investment decisions and even made 
NAV determinations, which in part enabled 
market timing.  In light of the publicly avail-
able material, interested investors would have 
inferred that if [Adviser] had not itself written 
the policies in the Janus fund prospectuses re-
garding market timing, it must at least have 
approved these statements.  This circumstance 
is sufficient to support the adequacy of plain-
tiff’s pleading of fraud-on-the-market reliance 
as to [Adviser]. 
In re Mut. Funds Inv. Secs. Litig., 566 F.3d at 127 (distinguishing Stoneridge in which 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption was not applicable because the transactions at 
issue were not publicly disclosed).  Note that some commentators believe that the 
Fourth Circuit’s attribution rule was something other than “substantial participation” 
because of its requirement that a plaintiff must prove that investors would attribute the 
misstatements to the defendant, a determination made by the court on a case-by-case 
basis.  See, e.g., Lesinski, supra note 118, at 100. 
 156. See, e.g., Lesinski, supra note 118, at 100 (citing Anixter v. Home-Stake 
Prods. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 157. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *13. 
 158. Id. (citing Brief of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Amicus Curiae, in Support of 
the Position of Plaintiffs-Appellants on the Issue Addressed and in Support of Neither 
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after Stoneridge, in June 2011, in the midst of this confusion, the Roberts 
Court released its highly controversial 5-4 Janus decision.159   
1. Janus Background 
The relationship of the Janus entities at issue is typical of most mutual 
fund/adviser structures.160  Janus Capital Group, Inc. (“Adviser Parent”), a 
publicly-traded company, created the “Janus family” of mutual funds, Janus 
Investment Fund (“Fund”), organized as a Massachusetts business trust.161  
Fund is entirely owned by mutual fund investors, and it has no assets except 
those owned by such investors.162  Fund retained Janus Capital Management 
LLC (“Adviser”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Adviser Parent, to serve as 
its investment adviser and administrator;163 in such capacity, Adviser pro-
vides “the management and administrative services necessary for the opera-
tion” of Fund.164  Adviser “manages the purchase, sale, redemption and dis-
tribution” of Fund’s investments; “prepares, modifies and implements . . . 
[Fund’s] long-term strategies[;]” and carries out Fund’s daily activities.165  
Notably, all of the officers of Fund were also officers of Adviser.166  Further, 
one of Fund’s trustees was associated with Adviser.167   As noted by the dis-
sent,  Adviser’s employees both drafted and reviewed Fund’s prospectuses, 
including the market timing language at issue in Janus.168  Adviser also dis-
tributed the prospectuses through Adviser Parent’s website.169  Critically, as 
noted by the dissent, Adviser “may well have kept the trustees in the dark 
about the true ‘market timing’ facts” at issue in this case.170 
  
Affirmance Nor Reversal at 7, Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 
F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-16190cv), 2009 WL7768584)). 
 159. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296.  Notably, the same Justices who comprised the Ston-
eridge majority also made up the Janus majority:  Justice Thomas authored this time, 
with Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Alito joining.  Id. at 2299.  Justice Breyer 
wrote for the dissent and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan.  Id. 
 160. See infra Part IV. 
 161. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id. at 2299 (majority opinion). 
 167. Id.  As noted by the Court, “[t]his is more independence than is required 
[under the 1940 Act.]”  Id.  Pursuant to the 1940 Act, up to sixty percent of a mutual 
fund’s board may be composed of “interested persons”, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(19) (2006).  15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a).   
 168. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.; see infra notes 225, 230-31 and accompanying text. 
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The prospectuses issued to Fund investors stated that the funds at issue 
“were not suitable for market timing”171 and could “be read to suggest that 
Adviser would implement policies to curb the practice.”172  However, in late 
  
 171. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 (majority opinion).  For example, the Court cited 
the February 25, 2002 prospectus for the Janus Mercury Fund, which “stated that the 
fund was ‘not intended for market timing or excessive trading’ and represented that it 
‘may reject any purchase request . . . if it believes that any combination of trading 
activity is attributable to market timing or is otherwise excessive or potentially disrup-
tive to the Fund.’”  Id.; see also In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 116-17 
(4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (detailing other market timing 
statements from Fund prospectuses).  “Clearly, . . . [such statements were] false, be-
cause at the same time . . . [they were] written, Janus’s managers were cutting market 
timing deals with large investors.”  Nathan Hale, Fund Investors Take a Hit from the 
Supreme Court, CBS NEWS (June 20, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
505123_162-37640654/fund-investors-take-a-hit-from-the-supreme-court.  
 172. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.  Market timing is a practice that exploits the 
method in which mutual funds value their shares.  Id. at 2300 n.1.  Funds typically 
calculate the net asset value (“NAV”) of their shares at the close of the major markets 
in the United States, and investors buy or sell at a price based on the NAV calculation 
following their order.  Id.  Timing delays in valuation information can result in an 
NAV calculation that does not accurately reflect the true value of the fund.  Id.  For 
example, if a fund values its foreign securities as of the close of the applicable foreign 
market and if events post-closing increased the value of such securities, such in-
creased value would not be reflected in the NAV calculation.  Id. As such, a market 
timer could buy mutual fund shares at the artificially low price and sell the following 
day when the NAV calculation incorporated the increased valuation.  Id. (citing Dis-
closure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68 
Fed. Reg. 70,402-01 (Dec. 17, 2003)); see also, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 
F.3d at 116 (discussing “time zone arbitrage” in connection with market timing trans-
actions).  Market timing harms other investors in the fund “by diluting the value of 
shares, increasing transaction costs, reducing investment opportunities for the fund, 
and producing negative tax consequences.”  In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 
116.  As articulately explained in the Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief: 
To choreograph a market-timing ruse, an in-
vestment manager needs – and arrogates for it-
self – control over all aspects of mutual fund 
operations: the manager advertises its funds to 
new purchasers through an affiliated distribu-
tor; the manager determines the policies that 
govern those funds and publicizes them in 
fund prospectuses that it writes; the manager 
monitors trading activity in the shares of its 
funds through an affiliated transfer agent or 
administrator; and the manager negotiates spe-
cial arrangements for favored clients such as 
hedge funds who engage in market timing. 
. . . .   
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2003, the Attorney General of the State of New York accused Adviser Parent 
and Adviser of entering into secret arrangements allowing market timing, to 
the detriment of investors who did not engage in such practices, in several 
funds in which Adviser served as investment adviser.173  Fund investors sub-
sequently withdrew “significant amounts” of money from Fund mutual 
funds.174  Adviser Parent and Adviser settled in 2004, agreeing to reduce their 
fees by $125 million, pay $50 million in civil penalties, and disgorge $50 
million to mutual fund investors.175 
  
. . . In sum, to perpetrate a market-timing 
fraud, an investment manager must coordinate 
all major aspects of a mutual fund.  The fund 
itself is little more than the manager’s weapon 
of choice. 
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *11-13 (citing TAMAR FRANKEL 
& ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS §§ 12, 21-22, 27, 
32 (2d ed. 2001)). 
 173. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.  Specifically, Adviser Parent allegedly knowingly 
allowed ten hedge funds to engage in market timing activities, which allowed them 
“guaranteed profits”, in return for the hedge funds’ agreements to invest heavily in 
other Janus funds, which increased Adviser’s advisory fees and Adviser Parent’s 
profits.  See, e.g., Hale, supra note 171.  Of course, such “guaranteed profits” to the 
hedge funds came from the accounts of other mutual fund investors.  See id.  
 174. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 175. Id. at 2300 n.2; In re Janus Capital Mgmt., LLC, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2277, Investment Company Act Release No. 26532, 83 SEC Docket 
1766 (Aug. 18, 2004), 2004 WL 1845502, at *4 (finding that Adviser had willfully 
violated (1) §§ 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, “in that, 
while acting as an investment adviser, it employed devices, schemes, or artifices to 
defraud clients or prospective clients, and engaged in transactions, practices, or 
courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon clients 
or prospective clients;” (2) § 34(b) of the 1940 Act, “in that it made an untrue state-
ment of material fact in a registration statement, application, report, account, record, 
or other document filed or transmitted pursuant to the Investment Company Act, or 
omitted to state therein any fact necessary in order to prevent the statements made 
therein, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, from being 
materially misleading;” and (3) § 17(d) of the 1940 Act and Rule 17d-1 thereunder, 
“in that, while acting as a principal, it participated in and effected transactions in 
connection with joint arrangements in which the funds were participants without 
filing an application with the Commission and obtaining a Commission order approv-
ing the transactions.”), amended on other grounds by In re Janus Capital Mgmt., LLC, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3065, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29377, 2010 WL 3071930 (Aug. 5, 2010).  In connection with the settlement, Adviser 
agreed to “use its best efforts to cause the Janus funds to operate in accordance with 
[certain enumerated] governance policies and practices[.]”  Id. at *5.  This fact alone 
emphasizes the reality that, with respect to Fund, Adviser exerted a tremendous 
amount of control and was no ordinary secondary actor.  See, e.g., Hale, supra note 
171.  
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Fund’s decreased valuation as a result of the market timing scandal 
caused Adviser Parent’s stock price to fall by approximately 25 percent.176  
First Derivative Traders (“First Derivative”), representing a class of plaintiffs 
who owned Adviser Parent stock, sued Adviser Parent and Adviser for viola-
tions of §10(b) and Rule10b-5, alleging that Adviser Parent and Adviser 
“caused mutual fund prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and 
made them available to the investing public, which created the misleading 
impression that [Adviser Parent and Adviser] would implement measures to 
curb market timing in the Janus [mutual funds].”177  First Derivative claimed 
that plaintiffs relied “upon the integrity of the market price of [Adviser Par-
ent] securities and market information relating to [Adviser Parent and Ad-
viser].”178  First Derivative also asserted a “controlling person” claim against 
Adviser Parent pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act.179 
The District Court of Maryland granted Adviser Parent’s and Adviser’s 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.180  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the complaint adequately alleged that 
the defendants, “by participating in the writing and dissemination of the pro-
spectuses, made the misleading statements contained in the documents.”181  
The Fourth Circuit held that the element of reliance with respect to Adviser 
was adequately pled, as “investors would infer that Adviser ‘played a role in 
preparing or approving the content of the [Fund’s] prospectuses.’”182  How-
ever, because investors would not make such an inference with respect to 
  
 176. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.  A “significant percentage of [Adviser Parent]’s 
income” was comprised of Adviser’s management fees, which were based upon the 
total value of the mutual funds.  Id.  Thus, when the value of the mutual funds 
dropped, so did Adviser Parent’s value.  Id.  
 177. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  Notably, First Derivative did not allege a § 20(a) control person claim against 
Adviser.  Id. at 2301. 
 178. Id. at 2301 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As noted by the dissent, the complaint set forth the elements of a typical 
“‘fraud on the market’ claim.”  Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. at 2301 (majority opinion). 
 180. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d,  566 
F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 181. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 
121 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 182. Id. (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 127).  It has been noted 
that “the Fourth Circuit is not considered to be one of the more liberal circuits when 
interpreting the scope of the federal securities laws.”  ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. 
LOWENFELS & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES 
FRAUD § 7:306.50 (2d ed. 2011). 
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Adviser Parent, the Fourth Circuit held that Adviser Parent could only face 
control person liability under §20(a) of the 1934 Act.183 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether 
Adviser could be held liable in a private Rule 10b-5 action for materially 
misleading statements included in Fund’s prospectuses.184  In a thinly-
reasoned and tediously-written opinion, the Court held that it could not.185 
2. The Decision 
With no analysis whatsoever regarding §10(b),186 the Roberts Court 
sophomorically based its opinion on selected definitions of the word “make” 
from the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary and the 1934 edition 
of the Webster’s New International Dictionary: 
One “makes” a statement by stating it.  When “make” is paired 
with a noun expressing the action of a verb, the resulting phrase is 
“approximately equivalent in sense” to that verb.  6 Oxford English 
Dictionary 66 (def. 59) (1933) (hereinafter OED);  accord, Web-
ster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (def. 43) (2d ed. 1934) 
(“Make” followed by a noun with the indefinite article is often 
nearly equivalent to the verb intransitive corresponding to that 
noun”).  For instance, “to make a proclamation” is the approximate 
equivalent of “to proclaim,” and “to make a promise” approxi-
mates “to promise.”  See 6 OED 66 (def. 59).  The phrase at issue 
in Rule 10b-5, “[t]o make any … statement,” is thus the approxi-
mate equivalent of “to state.” 
  
 183. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 
128-30). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. 
 186. The Court’s failure to begin its analysis with a textual interpretation of § 
10(b) and an analysis of how the 73d Congress would have dealt with the matter, as 
required pursuant to Central Bank, seems to underscore the policy-driven nature of its 
decision.  See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164 (1994); see also, e.g., James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar: The 
Supreme Court Turns Away Another Securities Law Plaintiff, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 463, 
465-66 (2012) (noting that Janus “stands the traditional method of statutory analysis – 
by which one starts with the language of the statute and then proceeds to analyze, in 
descending order, the legislative history, the statutory scheme, and lastly, policy con-
siderations – on its head.”); Pritchard, supra note 9, at 136-37.  Further, the Court’s 
decision to disregard the views of the SEC, which promulgated Rule 10b-5 and is 
charged with its enforcement, is puzzling, to say the least.  See supra note 64 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.   
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For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person 
or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its 
content and whether and how to communicate it.   Without control, 
a person or entity can merely suggest what to say, not “make” a 
statement in its own right.  One who prepares or publishes a state-
ment on behalf of another is not its maker.  And in the ordinary 
case, attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding 
circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by – 
and only by—the party to whom it is attributed.  This rule might 
best be exemplified by the relationship between a writer and a 
speaker.  Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is 
entirely within the control of the person who delivers it.187  And it 
is the speaker who takes credit – or blame – for what is ultimately 
said.188 
  
 187. In its Amicus Brief, the SEC articulately demonstrated that the speech-
writer/speaker analogy was flawed: 
Whereas the phrase “make a speech” generally 
refers to oral delivery by a single person at a 
discrete point in time, the Funds’ prospectuses 
were written documents disseminated through 
a variety of methods.  The prospectuses, 
moreover, were issued in the names of artifi-
cial persons (the Janus Funds) who by defini-
tion can act only through (and at the direction 
of) others.  In the context of such a written 
document, those who actually drafted the 
statements contained in the document can 
naturally be described as their “maker.” 
U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *15. 
 188. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  This speechwriter/speaker analogy has spurred 
many counter-analogies.  See, e.g., Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, 
at *7 (principal/microphone and speakers); Redwood, supra note 186, at 496 (general 
contractor/subcontractor); Hale, supra note 171 (puppeteer/puppet); Brent Kendall, 
Janus Found Not Liable for Funds’ Prospectuses, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303848104576383453742250090.ht
ml (quoting Professor William Birdthistle of Chicago-Kent College of Law) (manipu-
lator/marionette); see also New York Times Editorial, supra note 11 (stating that Ad-
viser Parent used “legal ventriloquism to speak through the business trust and Janus 
funds”).  
  Given that the majority’s decision is premised upon a suspension of the reali-
ties of mutual fund law and practice, this Article suggests that the Oz analogy is ap-
propriate.  See supra note 14.  The scene in L. Frank Baum’s 1899 story (which 
formed the basis for the 1939 movie) in which Dorothy’s group discovers “a little, old 
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Rejecting the Government’s contention that “make” should be inter-
preted as “create[,]”189 the majority continued its abstruse analysis: 
  
“But, I don’t understand,” said Dorothy, in 
bewilderment. “How was it that you appeared 
to me as a great Head?” 
“That was one of my tricks,” answered Oz.  
“Step this way, please, and I will tell you all 
about it.” 
He led the way to a small chamber in the rear 
of the Throne Room, and they all followed 
him.  He pointed to the corner, in which lay the 
Great Head, made out of many thicknesses of 
paper, and with a carefully painted face. 
“This I hung from the ceiling by a wire,” said 
Oz; “I stood behind the screen and pulled a 
thread, to make the eyes move and the mouth 
open.” 
“But how about the voice?” she enquired. 
“Oh, I am a ventriloquist,” said the little man, 
“I can throw the sound of my voice wherever I 
wish, so that you thought it was coming out of 
the Head.  
L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 181-86 (100th Anniv. Ed., Harper 
Collins 2000). 
 189. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 
*14-15).  The SEC and DOJ asserted: 
For purposes of the question presented here, 
the most salient feature of the Commission’s 
interpretation is the conclusion that one can 
“make” a statement by “creat[ing]” or 
“writ[ing]” it, even if the statement’s creator is 
not expressly identified.  That conclusion is 
fully consistent with the ordinary meaning of 
the term “make.”  See, e.g., 1 Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary 1682 (6th ed. 2007) (def. 
I.1.c, transitive verb: “Compose, write as the 
author (a book, a poem, verses, etc.); draw up 
(a legal document, esp. one’s will)”; def. I.2, 
transitive verb: “Cause the material or physical 
existence of; produce by action, bring about; 
create or take part in the creation of; produce 
by action, bring about; create or take part in 
the creation of (a sound recording, film, 
etc.)”); Webster’s New International Diction-
ary 1485 (2d ed. 1958) (def. III. 17: “To cause 
to exist, appear, or occur”);  see also SEC v. 
Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (referring to “several common and 
representative dictionary definitions of ‘make,’ 
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The Government contends that “make” should be defined as “cre-
ate.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-15 (citing Web-
ster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (2d ed. 1958) (defining 
“make” as “[t]o cause to exist, appear, or occur”)).  This definition, 
although perhaps appropriate when “make” is directed at an object 
unassociated with a verb (e.g., “to make a chair”), fails to capture 
its meaning when directed at an object expressing the action of a 
verb.190  
The majority’s curt dismissal of the SEC’s interpretation of its own 
rule191 is mystifying and is in contradiction to the deference given the SEC by 
the New Deal Court.192  
  
which include ‘create [or] cause’; ‘compose’; 
and ‘cause (something) to exist’”) (citations 
omitted). 
U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *14.  
 190. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  The majority also, in a footnote, dispensed with 
First Derivative’s assertion that “indirectly” in Rule 10b-5 broadens the definition of 
“make”, stating, “[w]e think the phrase merely clarifies that as long as a statement is 
made, it does not matter whether the statement was communicated directly or indi-
rectly to the recipient.”  Id. at 2305 n.11.  The majority further muddied its muddy 
waters: “In this case, we need not define precisely what it means to communicate a 
‘made’ statement indirectly because none of the statements in the prospectuses were 
attributed, explicitly or implicitly, to [Adviser]. . . . More may be required to find that 
a person or entity made a statement indirectly, but attribution is necessary.”  Id.  The 
dissent strongly noted that this attribution rule was unsupported by citation to any 
relevant legal authority.  Id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Redwood, 
supra note 186, at 480 n.112 (noting the arguments of First Derivative and the United 
States as amicus that, with respect to § 10(b),  “‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ are adverbs 
that cannot grammatically modify prepositional phrases”); id. at 484 (“[N]either the 
actual language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 nor the grammatical structure of the 
statute and rule supports the Court’s limitation of the word ‘indirectly’ to the method 
of communication.”).  As noted by the SEC, “[i]f an issuer can ‘indirectly make’ an 
untrue statement by using an analyst as a conduit, other persons can likewise indi-
rectly make an untrue statement through an issuer.”  U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra 
note 7, at *16. 
 191. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8 (majority opinion).  As asserted by the SEC: 
The Commission’s interpretation of the term 
“make” in Rule 10b-5 – having been adopted 
in the agency’s briefs and in a formal adjudica-
tion – is “controlling” as long as it is not 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 
461 (1997) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); accord Federal Express Corp. 
v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (defer-
ring to the interpretation of an EEOC regula-
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In his dissent, Justice Breyer countered: 
But where can the majority find legal support for the rule that it 
enunciates?  The English language does not impose upon the word 
“make” boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative.  
Every day, hosts of corporate officials make statements with con-
tent that more senior officials or the board of directors have “ulti-
mate authority” to control.  So do cabinet officials make statements 
about matters that the Constitution places within the ultimate 
authority of the President.  So do thousands, perhaps millions, of 
other employees make statements that, as to content, form, or tim-
ing, are subject to the control of another. Nothing in the English 
language prevents one from saying that several different individu-
als, separately or together, “make” a statement that each has a hand 
in producing.193 
  
tion advanced in an amicus brief); cf. SEC v. 
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-820 (2002) (ac-
cording Chevron deference to an SEC interpre-
tation of the “text of § 10(b)” adopted in a 
“formal adjudication”).  
U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *13-14. 
 192. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Pritchard, supra 
note 9, at 117. 
 193. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2306 
(“[B]oth language and case law indicate that, depending upon the circumstances, a 
management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or others, 
separately or together, might ‘make’ statements contained in a firm’s prospectus – 
even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility”) (emphasis 
added).  Some commentators have expressed complete bewilderment at the majority’s 
selective use of the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY.  See, e.g., Redwood, supra note 
186, at 466 (“[E]ven if one focuses in solely on the Oxford English Dictionary, it is 
evident that a multitude of definitions of the verb “to make” was available to the 
Court.  Many of these definitions would have supported the plaintiffs in their efforts 
to hold [Adviser] liable as a ‘maker’ of the fund prospectus misstatements in ques-
tion.”); id. at 495 (“Perhaps recognizing that its excursion into ‘definition 59,’ dead-
ending as it did in the cul-de-sac of the transitive versus intransitive debate, did al-
most nothing to advance understanding of the term, and being perhaps too daunted to 
tackle any of the other ninety-five definitions propounded by the . . . [OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY], the Court abruptly abandoned the definitional field entirely 
and substituted instead a ‘test’ for what is meant by the verb ‘to make.’”).  Other 
commentators have noted that the Janus Court’s definition of “make” has created “an 
unusual carve-out for securities-related speech” that is inconsistent with other treat-
ments of actionable speech.  Edward Pekarek & Genavieve Shingle, The Make Be-
lieve of Janus, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N SEC. LITIG. ARB. (Oct. 13, 2011, 5:20 PM), 
http://nysbar.com/blogs/SecuritiesLitigation/2011/10/the_make_believe_of_janus.htm
l (discussing concepts of actionable speech under defamation law; the Lanham Act, 
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In a logical leap, the Court opined that Central Bank’s ban on private 
aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5 required its ruling adopting the 
“ultimate authority” test.194  Drawing “a clean line” between those who are 
primarily liable and those who are secondarily liable, the Court held that “the 
maker is the person or entity with ultimate authority over a statement and 
others are not.”195  Thus, according to the majority’s test, only those with 
“ultimate authority” can be held primarily liable under Rule 10b-5 as the 
“maker” of a statement.  
The dissent, emphasizing Central Bank’s secondary liability subject 
matter, countered that Central Bank “no more requires the majority’s rule 
than free air travel for small children requires free air travel for adults.”196  
Rather, the dissent viewed Central Bank as dealing with aiding and abetting 
liability with respect to those who did “not engage in the proscribed activities 
at all, but who gave a degree of aid” to those who did.197  Further, it con-
cluded that Central Bank supports the proposition that, under the right cir-
cumstances, numerous parties involved in the development of a prospectus 
might “make” materially false statements that would invoke primary liabil-
ity.198  The dissent highlighted the majority’s cautionary language in Central 
Bank that it did  
  
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006); and the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 
U.S.C. § 230, among other laws).   
 194. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (majority opinion). 
 195. Id. at 2302 n.6.  The dissent responded, “Where is the legal support for the 
majority’s ‘draw[ing] a clean line’ that so seriously conflicts with Central Bank?”  Id. 
at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 196. Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In fact, the dissent argued that the major-
ity’s rule extended Central Bank’s holding into areas “explicitly placed outside that 
holding.”  Id. at 2308. 
 197. Id. at 2307 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 198. Id. at 2308.  As articulately noted by one commentator: 
Can it be said, for example, that a building has 
but one “maker”? Although a sign on a con-
struction site might identify the architect or the 
general contractor, does that any the less make 
unidentified subcontractors not also the “mak-
ers” of the building?  Certainly a person in-
jured by faulty plumbing or electrical wiring in 
a building would expect that the subcontractor 
who designed, manufactured, constructed, or 
installed the defective plumbing or wiring 
would be held at least partly responsible for 
her injury, on the common understanding that 
the subcontractor was one of the “makers” of 
the building (assuming, of course, that the 
cause of the injury could be traced to the work 
of that subcontractor).  And this would be so 
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…“not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are al-
ways free from liability under the securities Acts.  Any person or 
entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a 
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omis-
sion) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be li-
able as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the re-
quirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.”199 
The majority and dissenting opinions also diverged in their interpreta-
tions of Stoneridge.  Emphasizing Stoneridge’s holding that “nothing [the 
defendants] did made it necessary or inevitable for [the company] to record 
the transactions as it did[,]”200 the majority opined that, likewise, nothing that 
Adviser did “made it necessary or inevitable” for Fund to include the market 
timing misstatements in its prospectuses.  The majority saw “no reason to 
treat participating in the drafting of a false statement differently from engag-
ing in deceptive transactions [as in Stoneridge], when each is merely an un-
disclosed act preceding the decision of an independent entity to make a public 
statement.”201  As discussed below, this is a misunderstanding of the facts 
alleged by First Derivative and the realities of mutual fund prospectus prepa-
ration.202   
  
regardless of whether the architect or the gen-
eral contractor might also be liable. 
Redwood, supra note 186, at 496 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 199. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2308 (quoting Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191). 
 200. Id. at 2303 (majority opinion) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 201. Id. at 2304. 
 202. In fact, the following exchange during oral argument between Justice Gins-
burg and counsel for Adviser and Adviser Parent elucidates this fact: 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Perry, you – 
you said that it was the fund’s lawyers who 
drafted the prospectus, but, in fact, it was [Ad-
viser]’s lawyers, the lawyers – they were in-
house lawyers for [Adviser].  And they served 
– and they served the funds in doing this pro-
spectus, but they were on the payroll of [Ad-
viser], and they were [Adviser]’s legal de-
partment. 
 
MR. PERRY:  Your Honor, like all lawyers, 
they wear multiple hats.  I represent multiple 
clients.  These lawyers represent multiple cli-
ents. 
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The dissent countered that the Stoneridge Court “did not deny that the 
equipment suppliers had made the false statements contained in the letters, 
contracts, and conversations”, but rather ruled that there was not “‘the requi-
site proximate relation to the investors’ harm.’”203  Further, the dissent clari-
fied that the Stoneridge decision was based on a lack of reliance on the false 
statements made by the suppliers, and that the suppliers’ fraudulent conduct 
“‘took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment 
sphere.’”204  As such, the dissent’s bewilderment regarding the majority’s 
assertion that Stoneridge supported its ruling205 was well-founded. 
In response to the assertions by First Derivative and its amici that an in-
vestment adviser is generally understood to be the “maker” of statements by a 
mutual fund,206  the majority opined in a terse, cavalier manner:  “We decline 
this invitation to disregard the corporate form.”207  The majority simply de-
  
MR. PERRY: They are in-house lawyers at 
[Adviser], but they also represent the funds, 
and the SEC has specifically recognized in the 
context of investment companies that where an 
adviser counsel is representing the funds, his 
client or her client, for those purposes, is the 
funds.  And here, these lawyers are very care-
ful to separate who their – their clients are for 
various purposes.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (No. 09-525) (emphasis 
added); see also Redwood, supra note 186, at 498-99.  In response to an interroga-
tory, Adviser also admitted that its in-house counsel drafted the prospectuses.  See 
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *20. 
 203. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Stoneridge, 552 
U.S. at 158-59). 
 204. Id. (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166). 
 205. Id.  
 206. First Derivative argued that as an actor delivers lines written by a playwright, 
so does a mutual fund via a prospectus deliver lines “made” by an investment adviser.  
Id. at 2304 (majority opinion).  
 207. Id.  Contrary to the majority’s holding regarding corporate separateness, as 
explained in the Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, “the record amply demonstrates 
that petitioners effectively merged the existence of the funds into their own: regarding 
control of ‘business affairs,’ . . . officers . . . (all 17 officers of the funds were [Ad-
viser’s] Vice Presidents), office space (provided by [Adviser]), . . . business address 
(shared by the funds, [Adviser], and [Adviser Parent]), . . . and signature . . . (the 
prospectuses were simply signed by ‘Janus.’”  Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, 
supra note 7, at *19.  Several commentators have noted that the Court “ignored the 
practical operational control held by [Adviser] and seems to confusingly merge con-
cepts of control with those involved in establishing an action for disregard of a corpo-
rate entity or ‘piercing the corporate veil.’”  Farris, supra note 48, at n.7; see also, 
e.g., Redwood, supra note 181, at 467, 501-11 (discussing the inapplicability of sepa-
rate entity protection in the case of fraud).   
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clined to participate in a more mature analysis of the complex issues pre-
sented, stating, “Any reapportionment of liability in the securities industry in 
light of the close relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds 
is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts.”208 
In contrast, the dissent viewed other cases as supporting the considera-
tion of the close relationship between advisors and mutual funds.  Rejecting 
the majority’s “ultimate authority” test, the dissent listed a long line of cases 
holding that, under certain circumstances, corporate officials and others can 
be liable under Rule 10b-5 for having made a materially false statement that 
appears in a document or is made by a third person who is not legally con-
trolled by such officials.209  The dissent also cited a string of cases holding 
that corporate officials may be liable for making false statements where they 
use innocent parties as conduits to the public (even where such statements are 
not attributed to such corporate officials).210  The dissent concluded: 
  
  It should be noted that, with respect to private funds such as hedge funds and 
private equity funds, both U.S. and non-U.S. advisers may be more vulnerable to 
liability for prospectus misstatements, as the adviser or its principals usually serve as 
the managing member or general partner of the fund, and non-U.S. funds may not 
have an independent board.  Farris, supra, note 48.    
 208. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.   
 209. Id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (noting that a “law-
yer, accountant, or bank, who . . . makes a material misstatement (or omission)” may 
be primarily liable under Rule 10b-5 if all elements are met); Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n. 22 (1983) (explaining that corporate officers, law-
yers and accountants who play a role in the preparation of a registration statement 
may be held primarily liable even though “they are not named as having prepared or 
certified” such registration statement); SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that an outside consultant could be primarily liable for making 
false statements where fraudulent annual and quarterly statements that were thereafter 
reviewed and certified by the firm’s counsel, officers and auditor); McConville v. 
SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a chief financial officer could be 
primarily liable for making misstatements that appeared in a Form 10-K prepared by 
her but not signed or filed by her); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 
1225-27 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that an accountant could be primarily liable for 
making false statements where fraudulent opinions and certification letters issued by 
him were reproduced in prospectuses and other reports for which he did not have 
ultimate authority)). 
 210. Id. (citing In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F. 3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that one may be liable for using an analyst as a conduit to communicate false 
statements); In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 38 (1st Cir. 2002) (refusing to 
adopt a test requiring legal control over a third party making a statement, as such a 
test would give “company officials too much leeway to commit fraud on the market 
by using analysts as their mouthpieces”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314-15 
(2nd Cir. 2000); Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997); Freeland v. 
Iridium World Commc’ns., Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 75-76 (D. D.C. 2008)). 
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In sum, I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule 10b-5, its language, 
its history, or in precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting 
the securities laws, intended a loophole of the kind that the major-
ity’s rule may well create. 
…. 
. . . The relationship between . . . [Adviser] and . . . [Fund] could 
hardly have been closer.  …[Adviser’s] involvement in preparing 
and writing the relevant statements could hardly have been greater.  
And there is a serious suggestion that the board itself knew little or 
nothing about the falsity of what was said. . . . Unless we adopt a 
formal rule (as the majority here has done) that would arbitrarily 
exclude from the scope of the word “make” those who manage a 
firm – even when those managers perpetrate a fraud through an 
unknowing intermediary – the management company at issue here 
falls within that scope.  We should hold the allegations in the com-
plaint in this respect legally sufficient.211 
Finally, the majority considered First Derivative’s arguments in light of 
§20(a) of the 1934 Act.  It viewed the theory of liability proposed by First 
Derivative as resembling but “broader in application than” control person 
liability under §20(a) of the 1934 Act,212 which, as discussed above, estab-
lishes liability for persons that directly or indirectly control violators of the 
securities laws.213  The majority refused to expand on the liability expressly 
created by Congress in §20.  The dissent disagreed, noting that the “possibil-
ity of an express remedy under the securities laws does not preclude a claim 
under § 10(b).”214  Critically, the dissent emphasized that, if an actor ex-
ploited an innocent intermediary, §20(a), which requires primary liability by 
the controlled party, would not apply.215   Further, the dissent emphasized that 
it was quite possible that Fund’s board of trustees knew nothing about the 
misstatements in the prospectuses, in which case, § 20(a) would be inapplica-
ble:216   
  
 211. Id.   
 212. Id. at 2304 (majority opinion); see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.   
 214. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Herman & Ma-
cLean, 459 U.S. at 388).   
 215. Id.  Janus has opened the door for a flood of litigation regarding the parame-
ters of “control person” liability under § 20.  See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 16. 
 216. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing In re Lammert, Re-
lease No. 348, 28, 93 SEC Docket 5676, 5700 (ALJ Apr. 28, 2008) (Adviser knew of 
market timing in Fund no later than 2002, but “[t]his knowledge was never shared 
with the Board”)). 
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The possibility of guilty management and innocent board is the 
13th stroke of the new rule’s clock.  What is to happen when guilty 
management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing materi-
ally false statements and fool both board and public into believing 
they are true? Apparently under the majority’s rule, in such cir-
cumstances no one could be found to have “ma[d]e” a materially 
false statement – even though under the common law the managers 
would likely have been guilty or liable (in analogous circum-
stances) for doing so as principals (and not as aiders and abet-
tors).217 
In such circumstances, under the majority’s rule, the dissent cautioned 
that even the SEC might be prohibited from asserting primary liability or 
aiding and abetting liability.218  Paving the way for the next prominent case in 
securities fraud law, the Court reserved the issue of whether Congress had 
created liability for entities acting through innocent intermediaries in § 
20(b).219  
Although the Janus Court intended to create a workable, bright line test 
regarding Rule 10b-5 liability, the decision has confounded scholars, practi-
tioners and judges since it was penned.  Part IV explores why the decision is 
particularly impractical in the mutual fund context, and Part V summarizes 
the resulting confusion in the lower courts. 
  
 217. Id. (emphasis added). 
 218. Id.  As the majority did not specifically address this point, it is impossible to 
tell if this was an oversight by the majority or an anticipated effect of the ruling.  See 
Juris, supra note 60 (suggesting that the decision’s effect on the SEC was most likely 
an unintended and unanticipated result from a poorly worded opinion).  This is in 
contrast to the Court’s approach in Stoneridge, which was premised on a reliance 
analysis and would therefore not be applicable to the SEC.  See supra note 129.  It 
should be noted that the SEC may also, of course, pursue violators under other appli-
cable laws, including pertinent sections of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the Advisers 
Act, 1940 Act, and the Trust Indenture Act.  See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 138;  see 
also, e.g., supra note 175.  
 219. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10 (majority opinion).  In response, the dissent 
stated that, if § 20(b) provided a possible basis for liability, the majority should have 
remanded for possible amendment of the complaint.  Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).  The dissent further noted that “[t]here is a dearth of authority construing [§] 
20(b)” because that section “has been thought largely superfluous in 10b-5 cases.”  Id. 
(quoting 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES 
LAW § 11-8 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As such, First Derivative 
reasonably believed that it had referred to the proper law, and “is faultless for failing 
to mention § 20(b) as well.”  Id.  
  Section 20(b) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do 
under the provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by 
means of any other person.”  15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006) (emphasis added).  
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IV. THE PRACTICAL REALITIES AND DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE MUTUAL FUND/ ADVISER RELATIONSHIP 
As noted above, the Janus decision precipitated a barrage of criticism 
from scholars and practitioners.220  A New York Times Editorial stated: 
Justice Thomas’s opinion is short and, from the mutual fund indus-
try’s perspective, very sweet: [Adviser Parent and Adviser] were 
heavily involved in preparing the prospectuses, but they didn’t 
“make” the statements so they can’t be held liable.  Only the busi-
ness trust set up to hold the funds can be held liable, though it has 
no assets of its own to compensate plaintiffs in the lawsuit.  Which 
means that there is no one to sue for the misleading prospectuses. 
  
 220. See, e.g., Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *2-3 (predict-
ing that a victory by Adviser Parent and Adviser would “furnish a blueprint for wide-
spread impunity from securities violations” and that “[a]ny corporation that publicly 
claims to police the quality of its products while surreptitiously soliciting douceurs to 
compromise that quality – as a investment manager does in a market-timing fraud – 
would receive a tutorial on how to evade legal liability.”); Redwood, supra note 181, 
at 466 (“In this author’s view, the Court’s holding is based on raw policy and little 
else.”); O’Brien & Broche, supra note 153 (noting that commentators have critiqued 
Janus as giving corporations “a license to lie” and as providing “a roadmap for 
fraud”); Hale, supra note 171 (“[T]he Supreme Court struck a blow against the rights 
of mutual fund investors, and in the process might have opened a Pandora’s box, 
providing corporate America a road map that will allow them to avoid liability from 
investor suits.”); New York Times Editorial, supra note 11 (noting that Justice Tho-
mas’ Janus opinion “has made it much harder for private lawsuits to succeed against 
mutual fund malefactors, even when they have admitted to lying and cheating”); 
Gordon, supra note 16 (“Janus Capital Group does real damage. . . . At a time when 
an increasingly large share of investment activity occurs through large pools of capi-
tal, the decision exacerbates the problem of ‘agency capitalism’ – the tendency of the 
managing agents to pursue their own objectives at the expense of the ultimate benefi-
ciaries.  Why strain to find ways to insulate wrong-doers from accountability sys-
tems?”); Pekarek & Shingle, supra note 193 (“It appears the Janus Court may have 
ushered in an era that may only make the capital markets increasingly risky for the 
investing public, and stock market charlatans can almost be heard saying, ‘go ahead . . 
. make my day.’”); Walter, supra note 35 (“Janus represents [a decision] . . . that is 
shockingly out of line with the realities of the marketplace”). 
  On the other hand, others praised the “much-needed certainty” provided by 
the decision’s bright-line test.  Kendall, supra note 188. Commentators have noted 
that shareholders of Fund could have most likely prevailed in a suit against Fund 
under §§ 11, 12 and 15 of the 1933 Act and under Rule 10b-5, assuming proof of 
damages.  See, e.g., Farris, supra note 48.  Although Adviser Parent shareholders 
were without remedy in Janus, it has been posted that perhaps they could have been 
successful in a suit against Adviser Parent based on omissions of material fact in 
Adviser Parent public filings.  See, e.g., id. 
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There is no doubt that [Adviser Parent] is responsible.  It used legal 
ventriloquism to speak through the business trust and Janus funds.  
[Adviser] does everything for the funds, which have no employees.  
As Justice Stephen Breyer writes in dissent, “The relationship be-
tween  [Adviser] and the Fund could hardly have been closer.”221 
As set forth below, two fundamental untruths provide the pillars for Jus-
tice Thomas’ Janus decision: first, investment managers of mutual funds “are 
simply the minions of those funds,” and second, “the lifeless funds created 
and controlled by managers enjoy meaningful independent existence[.]”222  In 
short, Janus is premised on the notion  
that investment managers are merely subaltern “service providers” 
orbiting funds at a great distance, tethered only by the flimsiest 
thread of contract.  Very much to the contrary, investment manag-
ers are prime movers who reign from the center of the mutual fund 
universe.  In the beginning, managers create, incubate, and hold 
their funds as wholly owned subsidiaries.  During this period of in-
fancy, when the manager owns every share and every dollar in a 
fund, the manager and fund execute a contract . . . whose . . . signa-
tories are each controlled by the manager.223 
As noted above, in light of the numerous front page stories of mutual 
fund adviser misconduct over the last decade, including scandals involving 
market timing, late trading, valuation misconduct and soft-dollar practices, 224 
Janus’ absolution of advisers under Rule 10b-5(b) is a wrong that should be 
legislatively remedied. 
A.  Background Regarding the Mutual Fund/ Adviser Relationship 
The mutual fund industry has grown exponentially since the enactment 
of the 1940 Act.225  Total net mutual fund assets have grown from $0.45 bil-
lion in 1940 to $13.05 trillion in 2012.226  Further, the number of funds during 
that time frame has grown from 68 to 7596,227 and the number of shareholder 
  
 221. New York Times Editorial, supra note 11 (quoting Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2313 
(Breyer, J. dissenting)). 
 222. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *2.   
 223. Id. at *4-5 (citations omitted).   
 224. Id. at *23-24 (citing Josh Friedman, FleetBoston, BofA to Pay $675 Million, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004). 
 225. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1425 (2010). 
 226. INV. CO. INSTIT., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 142 (53d ed. 
2013), http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.  
 227. Id. 
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accounts has grown from 296,000 to 264,131,000.228  Investors generally 
expect mutual funds to be relatively safe, well-regulated investments; over 44 
percent of households in the United States own shares of mutual funds.229  
Further, ninety-three percent of mutual fund investors are saving for retire-
ment.230 Given these numbers, Justice Thomas’ Janus opinion creates the 
potential for real harm. 
The 1940 Act was enacted because of Congress’ “concern with the po-
tential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies”231 and its 
realization “that the relationship between a fund and its investment adviser 
was fraught with potential conflicts of interest[.]”232 
Before the enactment of the 1940 Act, there were widespread abuses by 
investment companies and their sponsors, resulting in disastrous conse-
quences to investors.233   According to SEC estimates, investors lost forty 
percent of their investment company investments from 1929 to 1936, and 
numerous funds failed.234  As a result, Congress commissioned a comprehen-
sive study of the investment company industry in 1935, referred to as the 
“Investment Trust Study,” which confirmed alarming abuses endemic in the 
industry.235  Investors, who were generally unsophisticated, were frequently 
mislead and “often did not understand their rights, the sales charges they were 
obligated to pay, or how the investment company’s manager was managing 
the company’s assets.”236  In short, “investment companies were being orga-
nized and operated to benefit the interests of their affiliates rather than the 
interests of their shareholders.”237  Funds were structured so that “unscrupu-
  
 228. Id. 
 229. See, e.g., id. at 90; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Seeks Public 
Comment on Use of Derivatives by Mutual Funds and Other Investment Companies 
(Aug. 31, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Fact Sheet], available at http://www.sec.gov/news 
/press/2011/2011-175.htm; see also COMM. ON FED. REGULATION OF SECS., ABA 
SECTION OF BUS. L., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INVESTMENT COMPANY USE OF 
DERIVATIVES AND LEVERAGE 3 (2010). 
 230. 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 226, at 91. 
 231. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010) (quoting Daily 
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 232. Id.  (quoting Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 536-38) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 233. See, e.g., Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Remarks at the American Law Institute/American Bar Association Investment Com-
pany Regulation and Compliance Conference: The Exciting World of Investment 
Company Regulation (June 14, 2001)  [hereinafter Roye Speech], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch500.htm. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
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lous” sponsors remained in control, and conflicts of interest were rampant.238   
The investment company industry was so corrupt that some suggested that it 
was a “parasite upon the stream of industrial earnings, levying a toll upon the 
yield of blue chip companies, resulting in unnecessary administrative costs 
and taxes that were not economically justified.”239   
In light of these problems, Congress, the SEC and the industry worked 
diligently together to come up with the 1940 Act, which was “truly a negoti-
ated statute.”240  The 1940 Act is an extremely complicated, creative statute 
that borrowed concepts from the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the banking laws, 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Chandler Act (which 
regulated bankruptcies), and even the Civil Aeronautics Act; however, the 
1940 Act contains many wholly original provisions unique to the investment 
company industry.241  It is unfortunate that its doctrinal underpinnings and 
practical realities were disregarded by the Janus Court. 
B.  Mutual Fund Structure and Adviser Control 
It is well accepted, even by the Supreme Court, that mutual funds are 
significantly different than typical operating companies.242  The “extraordi-
nary degree of control” exerted by investment managers over their funds has 
been recognized by each of the three branches of the United States govern-
ment.243  In its unanimous 2010 opinion, Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.,244 
  
 238. Id.  Specifically, sponsors often viewed the funds’ assets as their own 
“source of private capital,” and embezzlements were common.  Id.  Further, improper 
transaction between the funds and affiliates of the sponsors were often detrimental to 
investors.  Id.  For example, underwriters often dumped unmarketable securities into 
their affiliated funds.  Id. 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id.  
 241. Id.  It should be noted that neither the 1940 Act nor the Investment Adviser’s 
Act of 1940 contain an express private right of action for fraudulent activity, and 
although some courts have implied private rights under the 1940 Act, “the strong 
trend is against recognizing implied private rights under the federal securities laws.”  
Clifford J. Alexander & Arthur C. Delibert, Private Rights of Action, in MONEY 
MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE ¶ 1070 (2010).  Further, “although each of the major 
federal securities statutes contains a provision providing that contracts made in viola-
tion of the statute are void . . . . [t]he Supreme Court has held that such provisions 
provide an implied private right of action only for rescission of the contract.”  Id. 
(citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)). 
 242. See, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *18-19 (citing Jones v. 
Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010)). 
 243. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *3.  The SEC has also 
noted that “the term investment adviser is to some extent a misnomer because [t]he 
so-called adviser is no mere consultant.  He is the fund’s manager.  Hence the invest-
ment adviser almost always controls the fund.’”  Id. at *9 (quoting In re Steadman 
Sec. Corp., 46 S.E.C. 896, 920 n.81 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Fur-
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the Supreme Court acknowledged the unique relationship between an adviser 
and a mutual fund: 
A separate entity called an investment adviser creates the mutual 
fund, which may have no employees of its own.  The adviser se-
lects the fund’s directors, manages the fund’s investments, and 
provides other services.   Because of the relationship between a 
mutual fund and its investment adviser, the fund often cannot, as a 
practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.  Therefore, 
the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual 
fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the 
American economy.245 
Investment advisers are “essentially responsible for writing the prospec-
tus.”246  Although mutual fund boards sign off on the prospectus language, 
they turn to the adviser to “vouch for the statements made therein.”247  The 
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief articulately explained: 
Were one to conclude that the manager does not make the state-
ments, misleading or otherwise, in a fund prospectus, one would be 
left to wonder who does.  To answer that the fund makes such 
statements would be to admit circuitously that the manager does 
so, inasmuch as the fund has no employees and its only officers are 
  
ther, “even the managers’ own trade association has reported the extensive degree to 
which managers run their funds, prepare fund prospectuses, and incur consequent 
liability.”  Id. at *14 (citing Brief for the Investment Company Institute as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, Jones, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (No. 08-586), 2009 WL 
2896317 (stating that “[m]utual fund advisers . . . prepare prospectuses, shareholder 
reports and other disclosures for which they have liability under the securities laws”)). 
 244. Jones, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (defining the parameters of an investment adviser’s 
fiduciary duty with respect to fees it charges a mutual fund).  Justice Alito penned the 
unanimous decision, and Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.  Id. at 1421.   
 245. Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Hale, supra note 171 (detailing the “en-
trenched” relationship between a mutual fund and its management company, and 
recalling only one instance in which a mutual fund board fired its management com-
pany, which was “hailed as a ‘watershed event for the fund industry’”). 
 246. Hale, supra note 171; see also, e.g., Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, 
supra note 7, at *19 (“The [Janus] complaint alleges, and industry practice supports 
the contention, that the fund manager ‘wrote and represented [its] policy against mar-
ket timers . . .”); Farris, supra note 48.  
 247. Hale, supra note 171 (“If the fund’s board cannot rely on the information 
they are receiving from the management company, I wonder where the Court sup-
poses they should turn?”); see also, e.g., Farris, supra note 48 (noting that “the pro-
spectus and most significant SEC filings would generally be approved by the fund’s 
board of directors”).  
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employees of the manager, who pays their salaries.  To answer that 
the board of trustees makes such statements would be to misunder-
stand fundamentally the process by which hundreds of pages of 
mandatory disclosure are created for each fund every year, a pro-
duction from which trustees are almost entirely absent.  In fact, the 
detailed and extensive content of fund disclosure is furnished al-
most exclusively by the one entity who knows that information: the 
investment manager actually operating the fund.248 
In comparing a mutual fund to “a microphone and speakers: necessary 
instrumentalities that insentiently broadcast the principal’s message,” the Law 
Professors’ Janus Amici Brief stated: 
The investment manager, of course, is always the principal, writ-
ing and broadcasting the communications of its funds.  And courts 
have long since ceased to find inanimate objects guilty for the 
wrongdoings of those who wield them.249 
The SEC articulately rebuffed the notion of the investment adviser as a 
secondary actor in its Janus Amicus Brief: 
Although [Adviser] [like the corporate officers who would more 
typically manage a company’s operations] was subject to oversight 
by the Funds’ trustees, [Adviser] is alleged to have performed the 
“insider” functions that corporate officers and employees would 
ordinarily perform, not the advisory role typically associated with 
outside service providers.  If [Adviser] created statements for the 
Funds’ prospectuses that misled investors about how the Funds 
combated market timing, it can be held liable for its own “direct[] 
  
 248. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *6-7 (emphasis added).  
An interesting question arises as to the liability of individual directors: 
The mutual funds’ directors signed the regis-
tration statements of the mutual funds on 
whose boards they sit.  Yet Janus suggests that 
individual directors, alone, cannot be consid-
ered to have “made” the statements because 
they alone do not have “authority over the con-
tent of the statement and whether and how to 
communicate it”; only the board as a whole 
does. 
Jay G. Baris, Jordan Eth, & Mark David McPherson, U.S. Supreme Court Limits 
Reach of Primary Liability in Securities Fraud Cases, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2011, at 2. 
 249. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra, note 7, at *7 (emphasis added) 
(citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) for the 
proposition that “[d]eodands did not become part of the common-law tradition of this 
country”). 
49
Kibbie: Kibbie: Currently Mandated Myopia
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: KibbiePaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 9:51 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM 
220 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78   
or indirect[]” statements to the market.  As courts have recognized 
in the context of conduits and publicly unidentified corporate em-
ployees, such cases involve primary liability, not aiding-and-
abetting liability, because the defendant is being held liable for its 
own conduct – not for merely assisting someone else.250 
The Janus Court’s requirement that aggrieved fund investors must sue 
the fund, which holds no assets other than those of such investors,251 rather 
than a fraudulent adviser, is troublesome because such an adviser would be 
highly motivated to hide its own deceit.  For example, in Janus, the Adviser 
“was the only entity which [sic] had a motivation to hide the market timing 
investments . . . [as it] received additional management fees based on these 
investments.”252  In sum, Janus does real harm: it allows a deceitful manager 
to “coordinate all major aspects of a mutual fund”253 for fraudulent purposes, 
while it reaps increased fees, hides its deceit and avoids Rule 10b-5 liability.  
Such an outcome must be rectified. 
C.  The Mutual Fund Board 
Practically speaking, in performing their oversight function, mutual fund 
boards rely heavily on the investment adviser.254  A critical feature of the 
1940 Act, as amended in 1970, is the requirement that no more than 60 per-
cent of the directors of a fund are “interested persons”, meaning that they 
have no affiliation with or interest in the investment adviser.255  Such “disin-
terested directors” are intended to serve as “independent watchdogs of the 
relationship between a mutual fund and its adviser.”256  However, as noted in 
the United States Janus Amicus Brief, the 1940 Act provisions providing for 
disinterested directors “simply ensure that a fund’s board of directors can 
‘supply an independent check on [the investment adviser’s] management.’ 
  
 250. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *23 (emphasis added). 
 251. See Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *2; Farris, supra 
note 48.  Notably, with respect to securitizations, aggrieved holders of securities may 
have no other recourse than to sue the special purpose vehicle that issued the securi-
ties.  See id. 
 252. Farris, supra note 48.   
 253. Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *13; see supra note 172 
for a discussion of the amount of mutual fund control that a manager must exert in 
order to perpetrate a market timing fraud. 
 254. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 171 (“And where does the board get the informa-
tion they [sic] need in order to provide their [sic] oversight?  Well, from the manage-
ment company, of course.”). 
 255. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), 80a-10(a) (2006); see also, e.g., Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422-23 (2010).   
 256. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Burks v. 
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979)). 
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The board’s oversight role does not change the fact that the adviser continues 
to provide the management.”257   
The Supreme Court in Jones recognized that a mutual fund board’s 
oversight role may be compromised in certain situations because of its heavy 
dependence on the adviser; in such circumstances, greater scrutiny of board 
actions is warranted.258  Specifically, the Jones Court noted that, with respect 
to adviser compensation, although “a measure of deference to a board’s 
judgment may be appropriate in some instances . . . the appropriate measure 
of deference varies depending on the circumstances.”259 
[W]here the board’s process was deficient or the adviser withheld 
important information, the court must take a more rigorous look at 
the outcome.  When an investment adviser fails to disclose material 
information to the board, greater scrutiny is justified because the 
withheld information might have hampered the board’s ability to 
function as ‘an independent check upon the management.’   But an 
adviser’s compliance or noncompliance with its disclosure obliga-
tions is a factor that must be considered in calibrating the degree of 
deference that is due a board’s decision to approve an adviser’s 
fees. . . .  ‘[P]otential conflicts [of interest] may justify some re-
straints upon the unfettered discretion of even disinterested mutual 
fund directors, particularly in their transactions with the investment 
adviser’….260 
In this light, Justice Thomas’ reliance on the “corporate separateness” of 
Adviser and Fund in the Janus opinion seems grossly misplaced.  By disre-
garding the important practical realities and doctrinal foundations of mutual 
fund law and practice highlighted above, Janus potentially disadvantages all 
mutual fund investors.  Using Central Bank’s ominous opener, “[t]hat bodes 
ill for” the ninety-three percent of mutual fund investors who are counting on 
their mutual fund investments for safe and comfortable retirements.261. 
  
 257. U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *18 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 258. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1429-30. 
 259. Id. at 1421. 
 260. Id. at 1430 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 261. 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 226, at 90-91. 
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V. POST-JANUS CONFUSION 
The Janus opinion has spawned many contradictory lower court deci-
sions over a variety of issues created by Justice Thomas’ opinion.262 This Part 
summarizes the confusing aftermath created by Janus. 
A.  Questions Regarding Janus’ Impact on Public Suits Under Rule 
10b-5, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, and Other Laws 
Historically, the SEC has typically charged corporate executives with 
violations of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and §17(a) of the 1933 Act in enforce-
ment actions.263  Section 17(a), which does not provide a private right of ac-
tion,264 provides: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any 
securities (including security-based swaps) or any security-based 
swap agreement (as defined in section 78c(a)(78) [§ 3(a)(78)] of 
[the Securities Exchange Act]) by the use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce 
or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon the purchaser.265 
  
 262. See, e.g., Jonathan K. Youngwood, Bruce D. Angiolillo & Jason B. Gumer, 
Lower Courts Seek to Answer Janus’s Open Questions, 8 SECURITIES LITIGATION 
REPORT 1 (2011).  
 263. See, e.g., ROBERT P. HOWARD, JR., LAW360, IN PURSUIT OF FINANCIAL 
FRAUDSTERS (2011), http://www.mmlawus.com/Data/Files/Articles/InPursuitO fFi-
nancialFraudsters.pdf. As referenced throughout this article, the SEC also pursues 
violators under other applicable laws, including pertinent sections of the 1933 Act, the 
1934 Act, the Advisers Act, 1940 Act, and the Trust Indenture Act.   
 264. See, e.g., Farris, supra note 48.  
 265. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) are 
associated with “scheme liability.”  See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 263, at 4; see also 
supra notes 119-52 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 10b-5 scheme liability).  
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It should be noted that, although §17(a) uses parallel language to Rule 
10b-5, it does not use the word “make” in connection with material misstate-
ments or omissions, but rather prohibits “obtain[ing] money or property” in 
connection therewith.266 
Although Janus specifically dealt with the private Rule 10b-5 right of 
action, the impact on the public right of action was immediately manifested; 
within a month of the decision, the SEC withdrew several primary Rule 10b-5 
claims against corporate executives and substituted aiding and abetting claims 
instead.267  The SEC noted in its withdrawal papers that, due to the Janus 
Court’s focus on the definition of “make” in Rule 10b-5(b), the decision in no 
way affected the analysis under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c).268 
In SEC v. Kelly,269 Janus’ threat to government enforcement efforts be-
came realized.270  In Kelly, the SEC asserted scheme liability claims under 
Rule 10b-5 and §17(a) of the 1933 Act against America Online Inc. execu-
tives who, the SEC claimed, “engineered, oversaw, and executed a scheme to 
artificially and materially inflate the Company’s reported online advertising 
revenue.”271  The district court dismissed the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 claims, hold-
ing that Rule 10b-5 scheme liability is inapplicable where the alleged 
scheme’s “primary purpose and effect . . . is to make a public misrepresenta-
tion or omission[.]”272  The court also dismissed the § 17(a) claims, opining 
that § 17(a) was “essentially the same” as Rule 10b-5, despite the difference 
in language.273 
  
 266. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2). 
 267. HOWARD, supra note 263, at 2 (citing SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, 
Inc., 6:09-cv-01963, 2011 WL 3759916 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2011); Docket entry no. 
83 (July 28, 2011) in that same matter)).   
 268. See id. (citing Big Apple Consulting, 2011 WL 3759916, Mot. for Leave to 
File a First Am. Compl. by S.E.C). 
 269. 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 270. See, e.g., Gregory S. Bruch & James C. Dugan, District Court, Applying 
Janus Broadly, Rules Against the SEC in Securities Fraud Case, 4 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 
156, 156 (2012). 
 271. Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3, Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (No. 08-cv-04612); see 
HOWARD, supra note 263, at 2. 
 272. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343; see also HOWARD, supra note 263, at 3. 
 273. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345; see also HOWARD, supra note 263 (noting that, 
two weeks after the Kelly decision, the SEC filed suit in SEC v. Sells, No. 11-cv-
04941, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112450 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012), asserting scheme 
liability (with no allegations of misstatements or omissions) under Rule 10b-5 and § 
17(a) against two sales executives); Complaint, Sells, 2012 WL 3242551).   Sells held 
that the SEC had alleged violations “beyond the making of material misstatements or 
omissions” and that Janus did not prohibit scheme liability claims under Rule 10b-
5(a) and (c).  Sells, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112450, at *20-21 (citing SEC v. Lucent 
Technologies, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 359-60 (D.N.J. 2009)).  Sells further held 
that Janus was inapplicable to claims under § 17(a).  Id. at *22.  
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Shortly after Kelly, the SEC’s Chief Administrative Law Judge followed 
the Kelly court’s analysis, opining that Janus prohibits scheme liability in-
volving misstatements under Rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) where the defendant was 
not the maker of the misstatement.274  The judge also held that despite the 
difference in language, the standard for primary liability under §17(a) and 
Rule 10b-5 was the same.275  Thereafter, the Central District of California in 
SEC v. Perry276 agreed that Janus is applicable to SEC claims under both § 
17(a) and Rule 10b-5.277   
Other courts have refused to extend Janus to SEC enforcement actions.  
For example, in SEC v. Daifotis,278 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California held that Janus was inapplicable to suits under 
§ 17(a) and also under § 34(b) of the 1940 Act, but applied Janus to the 
SEC’s Rule 10b-5(b) claims.279  The court stressed that “Janus was not a 
touchstone to change myriad laws that happen to use the word ‘make’ –  it 
  
 274. In re Flannery, Release No. 438, 42-43, 42 n.69 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011); see, 
e.g., HOWARD, supra note 263, at 3-4; Bruch & Dugan, supra note 270, at 159.   
 275. In re Flannery, Release No. 438, at 42 n.70; see HOWARD, supra note 263, at 
4; see also, e.g., Ethan Brown, ‘Janus Capital’ Will Likely Provide Powerful Defense 
Against SEC, WEINGARTEN BROWN LLP (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.wbllp.com 
/blog/archives/2011/11 (“This decision is significant because it suggests that there is 
increasing momentum for an expansive view of Janus Capital, applying it broadly 
against the SEC and to Section 17(a) in addition to 10(b). . . . As a result, Janus Capi-
tal appears increasingly to provide defendants with a powerful defense against the 
SEC.”). 
 276. SEC v. Perry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76018, at *21-22 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 
2012), partial summary judgment granted by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136596 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 24, 2012) (dismissing remaining claim under § 17(a)(2)). 
 277. Other courts have applied Janus to Rule 10b-5 claims by the SEC.  See, e.g., 
SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 
2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011).   
Further, after the Janus opinion was issued, the SEC on its own accord withdrew 
certain claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and substituted aiding and abetting 
claims.  See supra note 267 and accompanying text.   
 278. No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); see 
also HOWARD, supra note 263. 
 279. Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6.  Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact in any regis-
tration statement, application, report, account, 
record, or other document filed or transmitted. 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2006) (emphasis added).  The court also noted that Janus’ 
“stringent reading of the word ‘make’ followed from the Court’s prior decisions limit-
ing the scope of implied private rights of action under Rule 10b-5, and the same ra-
tionale does not apply in the context of Section 34(b) because there is already no 
private right of action under Section 34(b) claims.”  Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at 
*6; see also Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gumer, supra note 262.   
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was a decision interpreting primary liability under Rule 10b-5.”280  The 
Northern District of Ohio, in SEC v. Geswein, also ruled that claims under § 
17(a), along with Rule 10b-5 scheme liability claims, remain unaffected by 
Janus.281  Numerous courts have followed this line of reasoning.282  
  
 280. Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6; see also Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gu-
mer, supra note 262; Bruch & Dugan, supra note 286, at 159.   
 281. No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4565861, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011) (not-
ing that the SEC had conceded that it could not maintain a claim under Rule 10b-5(b) 
in light of Janus); see also Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gumer, supra note 262.   
 282. See, e.g., SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, No. 6:09-cv-1963-Orl-28GJK, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111923 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (noting that the SEC had 
withdrawn its claims under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 after the issuance of the Janus 
opinion, but holding that Janus was not applicable to claims under §17(a)); SEC v. 
Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 
2012); SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11-cv-116-FtM-29DNF, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26648 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012) (applying Janus to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5(b) 
claim, but not to its §17(a) claim); Sells, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112450; SEC v. 
Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16402 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2013); 
SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that Janus was inappli-
cable to the SEC’s §17(a)(2) and (3) claims); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 
5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134580 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) 
(holding that Janus did not bar the SEC’s claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), § 17(a) 
or § 14(a) (which prohibits proxy solicitation “by means of” misleading or false 
statements)).   
  Interestingly, the Pentagon district court decision, which held that  Janus did 
not bar the SEC’s claims under Rule 10b-5 (a) and (c) or § 17(a), created a split in the 
Southern District of New York regarding Janus’ applicability to SEC enforcement 
actions, as it contradicted Kelly.  See, e.g., New Decision Creates Split in Southern 
District of New York over Janus Decision, VINCENT & ELKINS (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://www.welaw.com/resources/pub_detail_print.aspx ?id=20661; see also Stoker, 
865 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66; SEC v. Garber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57643, at *16 n.50 
(S.D.N.Y., Apr. 22, 2013) (noting the split in the district and stating that Janus textu-
ally does not extend to scheme liability claims under Rule 10b-5(a), (c) or § 17(a)(1)).   
The Pentagon district court noted that, even though Janus did not extend to SEC 
enforcement actions or to scheme liability claims, the Pentagon defendants, an in-
vestment adviser and its chief executive officer, indisputably had ‘authority over the 
content of . . . and whether and how to communicate’ . . . the late trades” at issue.  
Pentagon, 844 F. Supp. at 422-23 (citing Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303).  Thus, the district 
court concluded that “[d]efendants’ ultimate authority over both the content of and the 
decision to make late trades as if they had been placed before 4 p.m. is undoubtedly 
sufficient under even the more stringent standard articulated in Janus.”  Id. at 423.  
Without directly addressing the issue of whether Janus applies to SEC enforcement 
actions and scheme liability claims, the Second Circuit recently agreed with the dis-
trict court and rejected the Pentagon defendants’ claims that they could not be held 
liable under Janus “because they did not communicate directly with the mutual 
funds,” but rather executed trades through their brokers.  Pentagon, 2013 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16402, at *19.  The Second Circuit stated that “[t]o the extent that late trading 
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The confusion caused by Janus is most surely affecting the SEC’s secu-
rities fraud enforcement efforts.  For example, in February 2012, the SEC 
settled a high-profile case against two former Bear Stearns executives who 
allegedly deceived investors regarding hedge funds that were heavily invested 
in subprime mortgage-backed securities.283  This settlement followed the 
executives’ claim that, pursuant to Janus, they could not, as a matter of law, 
be liable for misstatements in monthly reports to investors for which they did 
not have “ultimate authority” because they merely assisted in the preparation 
of such reports.284  The defendants also argued that scheme liability was in-
applicable.285  Although many factors likely influenced the SEC’s decision to 
settle, it is telling that the federal district judge presiding over the case noted 
that the case was being “settled for, relatively speaking, chump change.”286  If 
this lowball settlement was due in any respect to Janus’ flawed opinion, and 
if it is a harbinger of Janus-influenced lowball settlements to come, legisla-
tors and regulators should act to restore effective enforcement efforts. 
B. Statements by Executives and Other Employees – Who has “Ulti-
mate Authority”? 
Janus left many questions unanswered regarding who has “ultimate 
authority” within a corporate entity;287 the expected flood of litigation has 
  
requires a ‘statement’ in the form of a transmission to a clearing broker, we find that 
in this case, . . . [the defendants] were as much ‘makers’ of the statements as were the 
brokers . . . .  The brokers may have been responsible for the act of communication, 
but . . . [defendants] retained ultimate control over both the content of the communi-
cation and the decision to late trade.”  Id. at 20 (finding that defendants’ conduct 
“violated all three subsections of Rule 10b-5, not just subsection (b), which was the 
only subsection at issue in Janus”).  
 283. Peter Lattman, Bear Stearns Ex-Managers to Pay $1 Million to Settle Fraud 
Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Feb. 13, 2012, 9:51 a.m.), http://dealbook.nytimes.com 
/2012/02/13/bear-stearns-ex-managers-to-pay-1-million-to-settle-s-e-c-case/.  
 284. See, e.g., Ex-Bear Stearns Execs Ask Judge to Narrow SEC, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUS. (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20111221/FINANCE 
/111229968.  
 285. Id. 
 286. Lattman, supra note 283.  Pursuant to the settlement, one executive will 
disgorge $700,000 in unlawful gains, pay a penalty of $100,000, and be banned for 
the securities industry for three years; the other will disgorge $200,000 in unlawful 
gains, pay a penalty of $50,000, and be banned for two years.  Id.; Court Approves 
SEC Settlements with Two Former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Portfolio Managers; 
SEC Bars Managers from Regulated Industries, SEC Litigation Release No. 22398 
(June 24, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22398.htm (noting 
that the executives did not admit or deny the SEC’s allegations). 
 287. See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Decision May Limit Scope of Persons who Can 
Be Primarily Liable for Securities Fraud Under Rule 10b-5, KING & SPALDING (June 
16, 2011) [hereinafter King & Spalding Client Alert] http://www.kslaw.com 
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already begun, with varying results.  As set forth below, some courts have 
held that Janus applies only to secondary actors and does not apply to corpo-
rate insiders at all.  Other courts have held that Janus is applicable to corpo-
rate insiders, but the decisions vary widely in their analyses. 
1.  Courts Holding that Janus’ “Ultimate Authority” Test Does Not 
Apply to Corporate Insiders 
With respect to courts holding that Janus does not apply to corporate in-
siders, some have taken a “group pleading”288 approach in determining who 
makes a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5.  For example, the United 
States District Court for the District of Colorado explained in Touchstone 
Group, LLC v. Rink289 that “Janus involved a statement drafted by one orga-
nization on behalf of another such that the latter had ultimate authority over 
the statement” and that “[s]uch hierarchy does not apply in the case of a 
group-published statement published collectively by a corporation’s directors 
and officers.”290   
Other courts that have rejected the group pleading doctrine291 have 
nonetheless found Janus’ ultimate authority test to be inapplicable to corpo-
  
/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca061611b.pdf; 2012 Year-End Securities 
Litigation Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com 
/publications/pages/2012-Year-End-Securities-Litigation-Update.aspx.  
 288. The group pleading doctrine allows a presumption that group-published 
statements, such as those contained in press releases and annual reports, are attribut-
able to those officers and directors within a corporate entity that have daily control or 
involvement with respect to ordinary company operations.  See, e.g., In re Merck Co. 
Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., MDL No. 1658, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87578, at 
*19 (D. N.J. Aug. 8, 2011).  Many courts have held that the group pleading doctrine 
did not survive the heightened pleading requirements instituted by the PSLRA.  See 
infra note 291 and accompanying text.  
 289. 913 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 290. Id. at 1079.  The court also noted that, using the Janus analysis, the plaintiff 
had adequately alleged that two of the defendants had ultimate authority over the 
statements at issue, as they were the company’s chief legal counsel and chief financial 
officer, and “it appear[ed] likely that they possessed ultimate authority over any 
statement that they prepared or for which they were otherwise responsible.”  Id. 
 291. A decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York noted that “each circuit court to have squarely addressed the issue” prior to 
Janus held that the group pleading doctrine did not survive the PSLRA.  In re UBS 
AG Secs. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141449 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
28, 2012) (citing decisions from the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits rejecting the 
doctrine, but noting that the Tenth Circuit applied the doctrine without discussing 
whether it survived the PSLRA).  The UBS court noted that, although the majority of 
district courts in the Southern District of New York held before Janus that the doc-
trine survived the PSLRA, numerous decisions have since found that the doctrine did 
not survive Janus.  Id. at *30-31. 
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rate officers and have allowed liability where misstatements can be attributed 
to such officers.292  For example, the Merck court explained that the defen-
dant officer made the statements attributed to him “pursuant to his responsi-
bility and authority to act as an agent of Merck, not as in Janus, on behalf of 
some separate and independent entity.”293  The court explained that Janus 
“certainly cannot be read to restrict liability for Rule 10b-5 claims against 
corporate officers to instances in which a plaintiff can plead, and ultimately 
prove, that those officers—as opposed to the corporation itself—had ‘ultimate 
authority over the statement.”294 Such a reading, “[t]aken to its logical con-
clusion, … would absolve corporate officers of primary liability for all Rule 
10b-5 claims, because ultimately, the statements are within the control of the 
corporation which [sic] employs them.”295  
Likewise, in Sawant v. Ramsey,296 the United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut upheld a jury instruction that stated that one is a 
“maker” of a statement if he is “involved with the production or dissemina-
tion of the statement, such as through drafting, producing, reviewing, or as-
sisting with the preparation of the statement.”297  Quoting Merck, the Sawant 
court explained that Janus “did not alter the well-established rule that a cor-
poration can act only through its employees and agents.”298  
  
 292. See infra Part V(D) (discussing how the lower courts have addressed the 
issue of attribution). 
 293. In re Merck, 2011 WL 34444199 at *25. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. No. 3:07-cv-980, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112151 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2012). 
 297. Id. at *41; see also In re Fannie May 2008 Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 2d 458 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that “[i]n the post-Janus world, an executive may be held 
accountable where the executive had ultimate authority over the company’s state-
ment; signed the company’s statement; ratified and approved the company’s state-
ment; or where the statement is attributed to the executive” (emphasis supplied)). 
 298. Id. at *42-43 (quoting Merck, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *25) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted).  Because of the obvious fact of a corporation’s de-
pendence on its employees, an issue arises as to what constitutes scienter on behalf of 
a corporation; courts are split regarding the applicability of the “collective scienter 
doctrine,” which imputes the scienter of employees to issuers. See, e.g., King & 
Spaulding Client Alert, supra note 287; In re Merck, 2011 WL 3444199, at *29 (find-
ing that the complaint adequately alleged that the scienter of two officers could be 
imputed to the corporation).  For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Browing 
Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting Col-
lective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 523-29 (2013) (noting three lines of 
cases with respect to the collective scienter doctrine: a “strong” version, in which the 
combined knowledge of all corporate employees may be imputed to a corporation 
without identifying the scienter of a specific individual; a “limited” version, in which 
the scienter of an identified managerial employee may be imputed even though such 
employee did not “make” the alleged misstatement; and a rejection of the doctrine 
 
58
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/5
File: KibbiePaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 9:51 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM 
2013] RULE 10b-5 229 
Courts holding that Janus’ ultimate authority test does not apply to cor-
porate insiders seem to be in the clear minority.299  However, until the issue is 
uniformly resolved through the appellate process, ambiguity remains for in-
vestors, corporate insiders and issuers. 
2.  Courts Holding that Janus’ “Ultimate Authority” Test Applies to 
Corporate Insiders 
A majority of courts addressing the issue have held that Janus’ ultimate 
authority standard applies to corporate insiders, but such courts have been 
inconsistent in their application of this standard.300   As such, ambiguity re-
mains in these jurisdictions as well. 
An early and often-cited case applying the ultimate authority standard to 
corporate insiders, Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole,301 ex-
plained that Janus’ “interpretation of the verb ‘to make’ is an interpretation 
of the statutory language in question in this case, and therefore cannot be 
ignored simply because the defendants are corporate insiders.”302   Applying 
that rationale, the Hawaii Ironworkers court held that the plaintiff had failed 
to state a Rule 10b-5 claim against the defendants, who allegedly manipulated 
accounting figures “in response to a mandatory directive” to increase profit 
margins and to “ensure their continued employment,” because such defen-
dants did not have ultimate authority over such statements.303   
Likewise, in Red River v. Mariner Systems, Inc.,304 a chief financial of-
ficer allegedly used unsubstantiated numbers in financial statements because 
he was concerned he would be fired if he did not do so; the United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona held that plaintiff’s allegations were 
insufficient to demonstrate that the officer had ultimate authority over the 
statements.305  However, the Red River court held that plaintiffs had ade-
quately pled that another officer made statements where he allegedly “calcu-
lated and adjusted key numbers for the financial statements” and “had direct 
involvement in the preparation of false and misleading revenue projections 
and a business plan.”306 
In a slightly different scenario, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California held that “an executive who undisputably ex-
  
altogether, allowing scienter to be imputed only where the individual who made the 
misstatement also possessed the required scienter). 
 299. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 298, at 510-11. 
 300. See, e.g., id. at 510-20. 
 301. No. 3:10CV371, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011). 
 302. Id. at *10. 
 303. Id. at *14-15. 
 304. No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90959 (D. Ariz. June 29, 
2012). 
 305. Id. at *17. 
 306. Id. at *17-18 (internal quotations omitted). 
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ercised authority over his own [internal] non-casual statements with the intent 
and reasonable expectation that such statement would be relayed to the in-
vesting public should be deemed to be the person who ‘made’ the statements 
to the investing public (so long as it is proven that the statement was made to 
the investing public).”307  The Daifotis defendant made statements on an in-
ternal conference call with employees, who were financial consultants, but 
prefaced his remarks with a statement that the purpose of the call was to pro-
vide information that the consultants could pass on to their clients.308  But in 
Curry v. Hansen Medical, Inc.,309 allegations that a senior vice president who 
took actions to alter the company’s recognition of revenue were insufficient 
to demonstrate Rule 10b-5(b) liability where the court found that plaintiffs 
did not allege that the officer “made” any statements. 310 The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California held that plaintiffs’ alle-
gations that, “as a result of the decisions … [the officer] took to manipulate 
… [the company’s] financial results, he made it necessary and inevitable that 
false and misleading statements” would be communicated to investors were 
insufficient to state a claim.311  Plaintiffs’ arguments that, because the officer 
was a disclosure committee member, he was responsible for accurate press 
releases and filings were also unavailing.312 
Numerous other courts have applied Janus’ ultimate authority standard 
to corporate insiders, with varying results.313 As discussed more fully in Part 
V(D), the issue of attribution is closely tied with the analysis of who has “ul-
timate authority” over a statement within a corporation, and there are numer-
ous opinions regarding corporate insiders’ liability for signing or not signing 
  
 307. SEC v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 2d 870, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 308. Id. at 880-81. 
 309. No. C 09-5094 CW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112449 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 
2012). 
 310. Id. at *12-14. 
 311. Id. at *12-13. 
 312. Id. at *13. 
 313. See, e.g., Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 716 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2013); 
SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16402 (2d Cir. N.Y. 
2013); SEC v. Garber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57643 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013); In re 
Longtop Fin. Tech. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91004 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 
2012);  SEC v. Greenstone Holdings, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44192 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 28, 2012); In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Cartner, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011); City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 
814 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Youngwood, Angiolillo, & Gumer, supra note 
262; Joseph B. Crace & Matthew M. Curley, District Courts Grapple with U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Janus Decision, THOMPSON REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2011, available at 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com /Securities/Insight/2011/10_-
_October/District_courts_grapple_with_U_S_Supreme _Court’s_Janus_decision/; 
Jeffries, supra note 298, at 510-20.  
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public documents.314  Not surprisingly, the courts have been inconsistent in 
their approaches to this issue as well.  Given the subtle variations in the fact 
patterns of each case, and the ambiguities inherent in the Janus standard, it is 
difficult to draw the “bright line” that Justice Thomas had hoped would be so 
evident. 
C. Statements by Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries 
Conflicting decisions have also arisen regarding whether a parent corpo-
ration can be liable for the misstatements of its wholly-owned subsidiary.315  
In City of Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v. Energy Solutions, Inc., 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that a parent could face Rule 10b-5 liability for the statements of its wholly-
owned subsidiary because the parent had “control over the content of the 
message, the underlying subject matter of the message, and the ultimate deci-
sion of whether to communicate the message.”316  The court rejected the par-
ent entity’s claim that it could not be liable under Janus because it was a le-
gally distinct entity and because the allegedly misleading registration state-
ments were attributed to its subsidiary, not to it.317  Distinguishing Janus, the 
court held that, unlike the Manager in Janus, the parent, which was the selling 
shareholder in both of the offerings at issue, was the sole owner of shares in 
the subsidiary at the time of the initial public offering and planned to retain a 
controlling interest thereafter.318  Further, the registration statements refer-
enced the subsidiary’s agreement to indemnify the parent for material mis-
statements or omissions contained therein.319  As such, the parent had “ulti-
mate authority” over the alleged misstatements.320 
However, in a subsequent decision, a different judge from the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that “it fol-
lows from Janus  that Rule 10b-5 liability for a one-hundred percent share-
holder of an entity ‘making’ a misleading statement is inappropriate; rather, 
  
 314. See infra Part V(D). 
 315. See Youngwood, Angiolillo & Gumer, supra note 262; Farris, supra note 48, 
n.2 (noting that typically, the parent company is the listed company and would be 
responsible for statements in its prospectuses regarding its subsidiaries and that, if the 
subsidiary were the publicly traded issuer, then that issuer would presumably be re-
sponsible under Janus for statements in its prospectuses regarding its parent and its 
subsidiaries). 
 316. 814 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18; see also, e.g., Youngwood, Angiolillo & Gumer, 
supra note 262; Crace & Curley, supra note 313.  See generally Farris, supra note 48.  
 317. City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
61
Kibbie: Kibbie: Currently Mandated Myopia
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: KibbiePaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 9:51 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:11 PM 
232 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78   
section 20(a) is the appropriate source of liability.”321  The Optimal court 
explained that the “[p]laintiffs’ attempt to avoid Janus by conflating share-
holder control with ‘ultimate authority’” was unavailing, since the board of 
the subsidiary had the ultimate authority to issue the misleading documents in 
question, and not the parent.322  The fact that the parent had the authority to 
select the subsidiary’s board did not change the court’s analysis.323 
As with the analysis regarding corporate insiders discussed above in Part 
V(B), a post-Janus bright line seems elusive in the parent/ subsidiary context 
as well.  Further, as with the corporate insider analysis, the issue of attribution 
is closely tied with the determination of parent liability.  Ambiguities regard-
ing the attribution analysis are discussed in Part V(D) below. 
D.   Determining Express and Implied Attribution  
Lower courts applying Janus have varied widely in their interpretation 
of Janus’ statement that “in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement 
or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a state-
ment was made by – and only by – the party to whom it is attributed.”324  
  
 321. In re Optimal U.S. Litig., No. 10 CIV 4095 SAS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
119141, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011); see Youngwood, Angiolillo & Gumer, 
supra note 262. 
 322. In re Optimal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119141 at *16-17.   
 323. Id.  Likewise, in Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th 
Cir. 2011), the court noted in dicta that even though trust documents provided that the 
defendant entity was responsible for the filings of the trust, such provision did “not 
demonstrate . . . [that the defendant] had ‘ultimate authority over the statement, in-
cluding its content and whether and how to communicate it.’”  Id. at 693 n.8 (quoting  
Janus Captial Grp. v. First Derivative Trader, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 324. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  Janus’ holding that statements in mutual fund 
prospectuses cannot be attributed to investment managers is particularly problematic.  
As articulately posited in the Law Professors’ Amici Brief: 
Investment managers themselves strive con-
sciously to form a public connection between 
themselves and their funds.  When forming a 
new fund, the manager typically selects a name 
that blazons the manager’s brand upon the new 
fund by incorporating the manager’s name into 
the fund’s name.  Hence, at each of the puta-
tively autonomous funds at issue here features 
“Janus” in its name.  Investment managers take 
direct and voluntary measures to persuade the 
marketplace to attribute the performance of 
their funds to the operations of their managers.  
The marketplace, in turn, reasonably does so. . 
. . As an empirical matter, the marketplace 
demonstrated its widespread attribution of 
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Further confusing courts is Janus’ statement that “[m]ore may be required to 
find that a person or entity made a statement indirectly, but attribution is nec-
essary.”325  This section surveys some of the caselaw developing regarding 
the attribution issue. 
A substantial body of case law has developed regarding whether signa-
tories of documents containing allegedly misleading statements are the “mak-
ers” of such statements under Janus.  A clear majority of courts examining 
this issue under various factual scenarios have held that such signatories can 
be held liable under Rule 10b-5(b).326  However, in certain limited circum-
  
fund statements to investment managers: upon 
the public allegation of market timing in mu-
tual funds, stock prices of the accused manag-
ers fell rapidly.  
Law Professors’ Janus Amici Brief, supra note 7, at *8-9 (citing Riva D. Atlas, Janus 
Capital Meets the Enemy and It Is Janus, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at C1 (com-
menting that Janus Capital lost “more than 20 percent of market value of its shares in 
recent weeks”)); see also, e.g., U.S. Janus Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at *29-32.  It 
should be noted that, as a practical matter, it is commonplace in the market for issuers 
to use a legend on prospectuses and offering materials in which they expressly ac-
knowledge their responsibility for most statements contained therein. See, e.g., Farris, 
supra note 48, n.12 (noting also that “[u]nderwriters typically provide in underwriting 
agreements that the only statements attributable to them concern their name and ad-
dress and the amount of the concession or reallowance in a public equity offering”).  
Further, market professionals are typically careful to prohibit reliance on any state-
ment not contained in the prospectus.  See, e.g., id.  In light of the Janus decision, 
issuers may attempt to “reallocate attribution of some such statements to bankers, 
accountants, lawyers, industry research firms or other market participants . . . .” Id.  It 
is difficult to predict whether issuers will be successful in overcoming the inertia of 
past practice. 
 325. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.11; see supra note 190.  One commentator has 
noted that the Court “mistakenly appeared to believe that absent attribution, a state-
ment is not even made.” Redwood, supra note 181, at 486 (emphasis added) (“If the 
Court wishes to hold, after Stoneridge, that a misstatement which never comes to the 
attention of the plaintiff is not one on which the plaintiff can be said to have relied, 
and then to deny recovery on that basis, that is one thing.  But that does not mean that 
a misstatement was not actually made by the defendant, and the Court should not 
conflate what are in fact two separate elements of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action.”). 
 326. See, e.g., In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 2d 
277 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); SEC v. Merkin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155679 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
2, 2012); In re Longtop Fin. Tech. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91004 
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 04 Civ. 9866 
(LTS)(HBP), 05 MD 1688 (LTS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39454 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 
2012); SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2012); City of Roseville Emps. 
Ret. Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. 
Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011); SEC 
v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011); In re Merck Co. 
Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., MDL No. 1658, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87578, at 
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stances, courts have found that signatory status is not enough to confer liabil-
ity.327  
Further, courts have differed on whether an entity’s inclusion on an of-
fering document cover page is sufficient to allege Rule 10b-5(b) liability.  For 
example, the Optimal court held that a defendant’s inclusion on the cover 
page of fund explanatory memoranda “alongside several other support pro-
fessionals—including auditors, lawyers and custodians” was insufficient to 
establish liability under Janus.328  However, Scott v. ZST Digital Networks, 
Inc. held that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged Rule 10b-5 liability against an 
underwriter whose name was “featured prominently on the offering docu-
ments” and who was alleged to be “the architect of the fraud.”329  
Other courts have found express attribution in the context of advertise-
ments and press releases.  For example, in SEC v. Daifotis, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California denied a defendant offi-
cer’s motion for summary judgment with respect to fund advertising that in-
cluded his picture and a quote attributed to him.330  The court held that, even 
though the officer claimed that “’he did not give’ the quote and ‘did not re-
call’ seeing the advertisement,” the express attribution in the advertisement 
was sufficient to present the matter to a jury.331  Further, SEC v. Carter held 
that attribution was appropriately alleged where a press release quoted the 
  
*19 (D. N.J. Aug. 8, 2011); Jeffries, supra note 298, at 518-20 (discussing whether 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 certification constitutes express attribution). 
 327. See Ho v. Duoyuan Global Water, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 547, 576-77 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege that audit 
documents signed by “Grant Thorton” could be attributed to Grant Thornton Interna-
tional, Ltd., “an umbrella organization comprised of independent registered public 
accounting firms world-wide,” rather than its member firm, GT-Hong Kong, and 
stating that “[t]he fact that two parties share a similar name is not indicative that both 
may be held liable for the alleged misstatements, even if GTIL and GT-HK share 
close business ties”); see also Merck, 2011 WL 3444199, at *28 (holding that allega-
tions that an officer made actionable misrepresentations by signing certain SEC fil-
ings that were “knowingly or recklessly misleading based on their access to informa-
tion that contradicted Merck’s public statements” were insufficient under the PSLRA 
to plead scienter).  Further, some argue that Sarbanes-Oxley § 302 certifications are 
not always indicative of ultimate authority.  Jeffries, supra note 298, at 518-20. 
 328. In re Optimal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119141, at *23-24. 
 329. 896 F. Supp. 2d 877, 889-90 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing In re Allstate Life Ins. 
Co. Litig., Nos. CV–09–8162–PCT–GMS, CV–09–8174–PCT–GMS, 2012 WL 
176497 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 2012) (holding that a claim under Janus had been stated 
against underwriters whose names were prominent and in bold type on the first 
page)); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enterprises, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828 (S.D. Ohio 
2012)  (stating that private placement memoranda with defendant’s name prominently 
displayed on the front pages could be a “shared product”)). 
 330. 874 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877-78 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 331. Id. 
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defendant, listed him as the contact person and was attached to a Form 8-K 
signed by him.332 
More complex scenarios arise in connection with claims of “implicit” at-
tribution.  For example, in City of Roseville, the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held that even though allegedly mis-
leading registration statements were expressly attributed to a subsidiary, such 
statements could also be implicitly attributed to the parent corporation as 
well.333  The court reasoned that “[a] reasonable jury could find that, on the 
basis of the facts alleged..., [the parent’s] role went well beyond that of ‘a 
speechwriter draft[ing] a speech….”334  Likewise, in SEC v. Garber, an attor-
ney advisory opinion stating that certain debts could be converted to unre-
stricted stock certificates was attributable to defendants because they “solic-
ited the advisory opinion and had ‘ultimate authority…over whether and how 
to communicate it,’ at least in the context of the alleged scheme.”335  Further, 
SEC v. Carter held that the SEC had properly alleged attribution to defendant 
of a press release that was drafted by others in reliance on allegedly mislead-
ing information supplied by him; the fact that defendant allegedly reviewed 
and approved the releases before they were issued and was listed as a contact 
person was sufficient to allege that he was a “speaker.”336 Other courts have 
found implicit attribution under a variety of factual scenarios.337 
In sum, once again, it is hard to find the bright line with respect to the 
post-Janus caselaw.  Legislators and regulators should remedy the ambigui-
ties caused by Janus’ abstruse attribution language.  In the interim, more con-
fusing and conflicting lower court decisions can be expected. 
  
 332. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599. 
 333. City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 
395, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 334. Id. (citing Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302). 
 335. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57643, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2013). 
 336. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136599, at *3-4, 6-7. 
 337. See, e.g., Red River v. Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90959, at *17-18 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012); In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., Nos. 04 Civ. 9866(LTS)(HBP), 05 MD 1688(LTS), 2012 WL 983548, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); Jeffries, supra note 298, at 515-16.  However, implicit attribution was rejected 
in Reese, where the court noted in dicta that a trust’s SEC filings were not attributable 
to the defendant entity, even though the trust documents provided that the defendant 
entity was responsible for the filings of the trust.  Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) 
Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 693 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011).  Likewise, In re DVI Inc. Securities Liti-
gation rejected the implicit attribution of statements in a client’s Form 10-Q to a law 
firm.  No. 03-5336, 2013 WL 56083 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2013). 
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E. Liability Under §20(b) 
As intimated by the Janus dissent, liability under §20(a), which is de-
pendent on a primary violation, will be greatly curtailed with the reality of 
fewer possible “makers” capable of making such a primary violation.338  
Thus, because the Janus Court reserved the issue of liability under §20(b), it 
is expected that this issue will soon be working its way through the lower 
courts.339   Although plaintiffs have begun asserting §20(b) claims, only a 
couple of reported decisions have referenced such claims.   
For example, in City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement System 
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York dismissed the plaintiff’s §20(b) claims because the 
complaint did “not allege any plausible alternative theory where defendants 
are not primary violators and yet can still be held liable on a secondary viola-
tion theory through controlling” the corporate defendant.340  As such, the 
court did “not address the defendants’ argument that Section 20(b) does not 
create a private right of action that plaintiff can assert.”341  Additionally, 
Jackson v. Fischer held that, because there were no “viable allegation[s] of 
primary liability,” plaintiff’s §20(b) must be dismissed.342 
As noted by the Janus dissent, §20(b) “has been thought largely super-
fluous in 10b-5 cases,” and, as such, “[t]here is a dearth of authority constru-
ing §20(b).”343  Congress should act to bring clarity to the area. 
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FIXES 
A legislative and regulatory response is necessary to correct the damage 
caused by the trilogy of decisions discussed herein and to provide investors 
with the level of redress envisioned by the seventy-third Congress, which 
faced the widespread financial abuses endemic in the economic disaster of the 
Great Depression.  As noted by then-Commissioner Walter, “it is critical to 
investors, our securities markets, and our economy overall that these laws 
remain fully enforceable.”344 
Simply stated, it should not be the law in the United States in 2013 that 
a deceitful manager can potentially coordinate every essential aspect of a 
  
 338. See, e.g., King & Spaulding Client Alert, supra note 287.  
 339. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 202, at 6, 61).  
 340. 875 F. Supp. 2d 359, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 341. Id. 
 342. No. C 11-2753 PJH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36327, at *25-26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
15, 2013). 
 343. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 5B JACOBS, supra 
note 219, §§ 11-8, 11-72) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 344. Walter, supra note 35 (emphasis added); see also supra note 36 and accom-
panying text. 
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mutual fund for fraudulent purposes, while it reaps increased fees, hides its 
deceit and avoids private Rule 10b-5(b) liability.  Given the high percentage 
of the population relying on mutual funds for retirement support, the uncer-
tain state of Social Security reserves, and the historic level of government 
deficits, action should be taken. 
Policy arguments on both sides of the issue of whether to restore pre-
Central Bank Rule 10b-5 liability center primarily around concerns with re-
spect to securities class actions in general, including whether such suits effec-
tively deter securities fraud, whether injured investors are adequately com-
pensated, and how such suits affect the capital markets.345   
As has been noted above, in this era of slashed regulatory budgets, it is 
important that the private right of action be firmly established in order to ef-
fectively combat securities fraud.346 Although it is true that private plaintiffs 
may pursue certain expressly-enumerated causes of action against violators of 
the securities laws,347 said provisions do not offer the breadth of the pre-
Central Bank private Rule 10b-5 right.  Further, state law avenues have been 
greatly curtailed by the SLUSA.348  Finally, although the Fair Funds provi-
sion of Sarbanes-Oxley349 allows the SEC to distribute monetary penalties to 
aggrieved investors in the small number of cases that it has the resources to 
prosecute, such amounts “cannot necessarily make the victims [of such 
frauds] whole.”350  In this light, this Article suggests the following legislative 
and regulatory solutions.   
  
 345. GAO Study, supra note 6, at 38.  For an excellent analysis of arguments on 
both sides of the issue, see id. at 37-45. 
 346. See, e.g., id. at 6.  
 347. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  For an excellent discussion of 
current secondary liability provisions applicable to attorneys, investment banks, ac-
countants, credit rating agencies, and securities analysts, see GAO Study, supra note 
6, at 30-37; see also, e.g., Stephen M. Sinalko & Maten Koch, “Janus Capital” and 
Underwriter Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, NEW YORK LAW 
JOURNAL, July 12, 2011. 
 348. See supra note 111; see, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 26, 30.  SLUSA 
generally limits state causes of action for secondary liability to individual plaintiffs or 
classes of fifty or fewer.  GAO Study, supra note 6, at 30 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
 349. See, e.g., GAO Study, supra note 6, at 27.  Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in 
2002 to protect investors following several highly publicized accounting scandals.  
See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
 350. Walter, supra note 35.  Prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, monies 
were only distributed to aggrieved investors if there was a disgorgement order; how-
ever, the Dodd-Frank Act added a provision to allow the SEC to distribute monetary 
penalties to investors where there is no disgorgement order.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) 
(Supp. V 2011); GAO Study, supra note 6, at 28. 
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A. Congress Could Amend §10 and §20 
With respect to private aiding and abetting liability, Congress could 
simply revise §20 of the 1934 Act to expressly provide for a private cause of 
action, as has been proposed on previous occasions.351  Nothing in the GAO 
Study commissioned by the Dodd-Frank Act would prevent Congress from 
revising §20 in this manner. 
Further, with respect to the harm caused by Janus’ strained interpreta-
tion of the word “make” in Rule 10b-5, Congress could revise §10(b) of the 
1934 Act to expressly provide for a private cause of action for violations of 
§10(b), with a clear definition of “make” based on enumerated factors that 
parallel the “substantial participation test”352 or the SEC’s “creation” test,353 
rather than Janus’ “ultimate authority” test.354 
  
 351. See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.  For example, with respect to 
the determination of who “makes” a statement, one commentator has proposed a 
“benefits test” based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 
(1983), and Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988).  Redwood, supra note 181, at 508-
10.  In Dirks, the Court held that a tippee of inside information is not liable unless the 
insider providing such information has breached a duty by disclosing such informa-
tion and the tippee knew or should have known of such breach; in determining 
whether such a breach existed, the Court looks to “whether the insider personally will 
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”  Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662; see also 
Redwood, supra note 181, at 508-09.  Similarly, in Pinter, in determining who is a 
“seller” or “solicitor,” the Supreme Court held that “liability extends only to the per-
son who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to 
serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner.”  Pinter, 486 U.S. at 
647; see also Redwood, supra note 181, at 510.  Thus, the proposed “benefits test” 
with respect to the “maker” of a statement would provide: “A ‘maker’ would include 
not merely the actual person who issues the false statement . . . but also any other 
related party who, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial 
interests, was in a position to promote or influence the creation and distribution of the 
misleading statements.”  Redwood, supra note 181, at 510 (emphasis added).   
 354. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, the Dodd-
Frank Act amended § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i, captioned “Manipulation of 
Security Prices” to add two provisions that call into question the Janus Court’s defini-
tion of “make” in Rule 10b-5. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(d), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4), (f)); see also Pekarek & Shingle, supra note 193; 
Harriet B. Alexson, Intermediaries in Securities Transactions: Changes Under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, HARRIET B. ALEXSON 
L. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.alexsonlaw.com/blog/intermediaries-in-securities-
transactions-changes-under-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-
protection-act/.  Specifically, § 9(a)(4) provides that a dealer or broker may not “make 
. . . any statement” that is materially misleading for the purpose of inducing the pur-
chase or sale of a security, and § 9(f) provides for a private right of action against 
anyone who “willfully participates” in any act in violation of § 9(a), (b) or (c).  15 
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As noted in the GAO Study, various commentators have proposed legis-
lation for secondary actors that would incorporate liability limits with respect 
to such actors.355  For example, one commentator has proposed a liability 
ceiling for secondary actors, which would deter fraudulent conduct, while 
keeping liability insurance premiums at a reasonable level and obviating the 
need for in terrorum settlements.356 This expert proposed a ceiling of $2 mil-
lion for individuals and $50 million for public corporations.357  
Another proposal is to limit fraud-on-the-market damages to further the 
goal of deterrence, rather than compensation; such proposal would require 
defendants to disgorge their gains or expected gains and would not impose 
responsibility for all losses caused by the fraudulent activity.358  Finally, some 
have proposed that aiding and abetting liability be limited to proportionate 
liability for those secondary actors with actual knowledge or intent to de-
fraud.359   
As previously discussed throughout this Article, Congress should act to 
protect investors left potentially vulnerable in the trilogy’s aftermath.    
B. The SEC Could Amend Rule 10b-5 
An alternative to congressional amendment of §10(b) would be adminis-
trative amendment of Rule 10b-5.  Because the Janus Court referred only to 
Rule 10b-5 in its analysis, and not §10(b), it is possible that the SEC could 
amend the language of Rule 10b-5 to include persons who “create”, or “sub-
stantially participate in the making of” a material misstatement or omission, 
rather than merely those who “make” a material misstatement or omission.  
However, because the Janus Court purported to anchor its decision on Cen-
tral Bank and Stoneridge, which had nothing to do with the definition of the 
  
U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4),(f) (emphasis added).  The act of “willfully participat[ing]” in 
“mak[ing]” a misstatement seems to include more actors than the “maker” with ulti-
mate authority, leaving quite a conundrum for lower courts presented with this provi-
sion.  See, e.g., Alexson, supra (noting that “‘willingly participates’ is not defined[]” 
and that there is “no requirement in Section 9(f) that the willing participant have 
knowledge of the false statement, an intent to misrepresent a material fact, or even a 
careless disregard of the facts given to offerees”); Pekarek & Shingle, supra note 193.      
 355. GAO Study, supra note 6, at 37-45. 
 356. Id. at 44 (citing Evaluating S.1551: The Liability for Aiding and Abetting 
Securities Violations Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Liability Hearing] 
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.)).   
 357. Id. (citing Liability Hearing, supra note 356 (statement of John C. Coffee)). 
 358. See id. at 45 (citing Liability Hearing, supra note 356 (statement of Adam C. 
Pritchard)).   
 359. See id. 
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word “make” in Rule 10b-5(b), it is unlikely that the SEC would attempt this 
course.360   
C. The SEC or Congress Could Require Advisors to Sign Fund Filings 
If the SEC or Congress were to act to require investment advisers to sign 
all fund filings, such advisers would become “makers” of statements con-
tained therein under Janus, and thus subject to Rule 10b-5 liability.361  How-
ever, extending this requirement broadly to other secondary actors would be 
problematic, as the extent of their individual involvement in the preparation 
of such filings may not warrant exposure to primary liability. 
D. Rethinking of the Congenial Fund Board/ Adviser Relationship 
It has been suggested that mutual fund board members should be cau-
tious after Janus to not rely so heavily on their investment adviser for infor-
mation critical to their oversight function.362  As has been thoroughly dis-
cussed herein, the mutual fund board’s reliance on its investment adviser is a 
firmly entrenched matter of practice and doctrine under the 1940 Act, with 
the one contemporary instance in which a board fired its adviser being “hailed 
as a ‘watershed event for the fund industry.’”363 However, Janus has upset the 
proverbial applecart, placing board members in a particularly precarious posi-
tion.   
If Janus is not legislatively and administratively remedied, mutual fund 
board members must undertake a critical reanalysis of their relationship with 
their investment advisors, with a clear focus on their duties to their share-
holders.  Such a reanalysis would, without question, dynamically change the 
mutual fund industry as a whole. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As set forth herein, the Supreme Court’s trilogy of decisions constricting the 
Rule 10b-5 right of action has already begun to manifest harmful conse-
quences with respect to private investor suits and agency-driven actions.  In 
light of the high percentage of the U.S. population relying upon the perceived 
  
 360. See Pritchard, supra note 9, at 137.  Additionally, the Court’s statement that 
Rule 10b-5 could not be read to create “a theory of liability similar to – but broader in 
application than – what Congress has already created expressly” in § 20(a) would be 
prohibitive.  See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2304 (2011) (internal citations omitted); Pritchard, supra note 9, at 137. 
 361. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 16.  
 362. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 171 (“Perhaps fund directors will . . . decide that 
their relationship with their fund’s management company deserves to be much less 
chummy and more adversarial.”). 
 363. See id.   
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relative safety of mutual fund investments and the unfortunate reality of 
slashed regulatory budgets hindering securities fraud enforcement efforts, 
remedial action is necessary.. As the nation’s gatekeepers repeatedly demon-
strate their fallibility with respect to vulnerable investors, our response cannot 
be “caveat emptor” where Rule 10b-5 actions are concerned.  For the protec-
tion of investors and the capital markets, the Roberts Court’s “pay no atten-
tion to the manager behind the mutual fund curtain” dictate should be re-
placed with meaningful reforms. 
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